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Abstract 
 
What are the key factors driving farmers' choices of whom to sell to? This study searches for 
an answer. Transaction costs are hypothesized as the determinant of pig producing farmers’ 
choice of trading partner in this study. The farmers have a choice between two types of 
slaughterhouse. One of these is Scan, which used to be a farmer co-operative, but is now a so-
called FCB (Farmer Controlled Business). This implies that it is fully owned by the farmers 
who supply their animals to the slaughterhouse. The other type of firm is IOFs (Investor-
Owned Firms), which are profit maximising firms. There are many IOF slaughterhouses in 
the Swedish pig slaugher industry, such as Ugglarps, KLD, Dahlsjöfors, and Skövde.  
 
As it is impossible to measure transaction costs objectively focus is directed towards the 
farmers’ perceived transaction costs. Various socio-psychological concepts are used to 
interpret farmers’ perception on their transaction costs. The combination of transaction cost 
theory and socio-psychological theory generates a number of economic and social variables 
which may determine farmers’ perceived transaction cost. These variables are suggested in a 
series of the dependent or independent hypotheses. The hypotheses are tested by an empirical 
investigation which is based on a large number of quantitative data from the farmers. The data 
is processed by some particular statistical methods, such as chi-square test and t test.  
 
According to the results of the statistical analysis, this study supports the initial assumption 
that transaction costs are essential to farmers’ choices of trading partner. The socio-
psychological attibutes such as attitudes are expressions of the farmers’ perceived transaction 
costs. Other factors, like ownership structure, pricing strategies, and loyaly affect the farmers’ 
choice of trading partners as well.  
 
The findings of this study indicate that farmers’ perceptions of their transaction costs are 
various. Farmers delivering to Scan perceive higher transaction costs than the farmers who are 
suppliers to the investor-owned slaughterhouses. Based on the findings, it concludes that Scan 
would have to perform more efficient to reduce farmers’ perceived transaction costs.  
 
Key terms:  Sweden, slaughterhouse, pig farmer, transaction costs, socio-phychology.  
  vii 
 
 
Sammanfattning  
 
Vad avgör när lantbrukare bestämmer vilka uppköpare de ska leverera till? I denna studie 
anses transaktionskostnadsteorin bestämma lantbrukarnas val av handelspartner. För att 
empiriskt undersöka detta används transaktionskostnadsteorin såsom bas för en empirisk 
undersökning av de transaktioner, som sker mellan svenska grisproducenter och två typer av 
slakterier. Dessa är Scan AB (som är bondestyrt genom genom den finska föreningen LSO 
samt Swedish Meats) samt övriga slakterier, vilka alla drivs utifrån en 
vinstmaximeringsmålsättning.  
 
Olika socio-psykologiska begrepp används för att tolka lantbrukarnas uppfattning om sina 
transaktionskostnader. Genom att socio-psykologi kombineras med 
transaktionskostnadsteorin framkommer en rad variabler, som kan uppfattas mäta 
lantbrukarnas upplevda transaktionskostnader. Dessa variabler ingår i en rad hypoteser 
rörande lantbrukarnas val av slakterier.  
 
För att testa dessa hypoteser genomförs en empirisk studie i form av en enkät bland samtliga 
grisproducenter i Skåne. Data insamlas således genom ett frågeformulär, vars frågor är 
kopplade till lantbrukarnas attityder till deras handelspartner. De insamlade data blir föremål 
för stattiska analyser såsom chi-square test och t’test. Statistikprogrammet SPSS användes för 
analyserna av data.  
 
Resultaten av studien bekräftar att grisproducenternas val av slakteri kan förklaras med hjälp 
av transaktionskostnadsteorin. De socio-psychologiska variablerna (attityder mm) är uttryck 
för lantbrukarnas upplevda transaktionskostnader i relation till de två typerna av 
slakteriföretag. Ytterligare faktorer, såsom ägandeförhållanden, prisstrategier och lojalitet, 
påverkar lantbrukarnas val av handelspartner.  
 
De lantbrukare, som levererar till Scan, upplever sig ha högre transaktionskostnader än de, 
som levererar till de övriga slakterierna. Resultaten tyder på att Scan skulle behöva vara mera 
effektivt för att lantbrukarna skulle uppleva sig ha lägre transaktionskostnader, när de leverar 
till Scan.  
 
Nyckeltermer: slakterier, grisproducenter, transaktionskostnader, socio-psykologi 
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Introduction 
 
Recent changes related to the food production in Sweden have renewed the interest and the 
focus on the meat sector. Special attention has been paid to the development of Swedish 
slaughter industry since the Sweden’s slaughtering giant – Scan was sold to a Finnish meat 
producer. This takeover indicates that Scan is no longer a traditional farmer cooperative any 
more, and hence it is interesting to know is there any changes about the farmers’ attitude 
towards today’s Scan after the takeover.  
 
 
1.1 Problem background 
 
There are two types of slaughterhouses in Swedish slaughter industry. One is represented by 
the largest slaughterhouse – Scan AB, which used to be a traditional farmer cooperative. Scan 
AB has three categories of owners. The largest owner is the Finnish farmer cooperative LSO 
Foods, who has also the majority of the seats in the board; the Swedish cooperative Swedish 
Meats owns a smaller part of the stock and finally, a large share of the stock is owned by a 
variety of owners, trading the stock at the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The latter shares have 
virtually no influence as these shares have very little voting power. The system of different 
classes of stock is quite common in some countries, among them Finland and Sweden. This 
unique ownership form reflects that Scan AB is partly controlled by the farmers (Scan’s 
suppliers or the members of Swedish Meats). Based on this account, Scan AB should not be 
called a traditional cooperative but a farmer controlled business (FCB), which is “a 
commercial and legally registered business in which farmers or farmers' organizations hold a 
controlling stake (Internet, EFFP 1, 2007). 
 
The other type of slaughterhouses is investor owned firms (IOFs). Two of them (KLS Foods 
and Ugglarps) are owned by the Danish farmer cooperative Danish Crown, but Danish Crown 
runs these two firms as if they are investor-owned firms. The Swedish suppliers to the two 
slaughterhouses owned by Danish Crown are not members of the Danish cooperative but 
solely suppliers. The other IOF slaughterhouses are fairly small and most often family-owned.  
 
There is intense competition between these two types of slaughterhouse in Sweden, both 
concerning sales to retailers and other processing firms and their purchases of animals to be 
slaughtered. This study concerns only the latter market, i.e. how the slaughterhouses compete 
to attract farmers who are willing to sell their animals. It may be assumed that the farmers 
behave differently in relation to the slaughterhouses depending on ownership structure of the 
organizations. It seems reasonable to believe that the farmers who have some ownership (even 
though limited) in Scan AB should be more loyal to that firm, have more positive opinions 
and attitudes, etc.  
 
 
1.2 Problem analysis  
 
A study about farmers’ choices of slaughterhouse could be based on different types of 
theories. One type is the neo-institutional theory, and here transaction cost theory seems to be 
a well-suited analytical tool. Transaction cost theory focuses on the transactions between 
business actors. The costs occurred in making economic exchanges are viewed as transaction 
costs (excluding administrative costs), which may affect individual producers’ choice of a 
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trading partner from the various kinds of downstream processors. Swedish pig farmers are 
facing a similar problem as the rest of the agriculture producers, which is the choices of 
buyers between FCB and IOF 
 
Another type of theory that can be used in order to explain the farmers’ slaughterhouse 
decisions is socio-psychological theory. A large number of studies have been conducted with 
the aim of exploring different psychological determinants in relation to farmers’ decisions. 
These concepts are attitudes, loyalty, involvement, knowledge and trust, etc.  
 
To which extent farmers prefer an IOF or a FCB slaughterhouse is, however, depending on 
the market characteristics, notably the degree of competition that the farmers experience. If a 
large number of buyers are fighting each others in order to get supplies from the farmers, 
there is no market failure. Then it might be less attractive to deliver to a FCB. Hence, a FCB 
may not necessarily be considered to be the best partner.  
 
A conclusion drawn from the discussion above is that two types of theories are suitable for 
this study. Transaction cost theory is used, to some extent, to prove that this theory offers a 
way whereby the behavior of the different categories of farmers (the Scan suppliers, and the 
IOF suppliers) can be estimated in a comparable way. The transaction cost theory is, however, 
based on a number of behavioral assumptions, which may be debatable, like the assumption 
that the actors are utility maximizing and they may act opportunistically. For this sake, it is 
advisable to include behavioral theory in the form of socio-psychology. The composition of 
the individually perceived transaction costs may be elucidated with the help of socio-
psychological theory. In case the farmers have bad attitudes toward a slaughterhouse, they 
consider themselves to have high transaction costs in relation to that firm, for example.  
 
 
1.3 Aim 
 
Hence the aim of this study can be stated as to explore how Swedish pig farmers consider 
their transaction costs when choosing a slaughterhouse to sell their animals to. The word 
“how” implies that different types of socio-psychological concepts may serve as explanatory 
variables when the transaction costs are to be assessed.  
 
In order to accomplish this aim, an empirical study is to be conducted. The data must 
originate from the pig farmers themselves.  
 
The study would be of special interest for all pig slaughterhouses in Sweden and perhaps also 
abroad. Especially Scan AB will use the findings as this firm is the only one that is labeled as 
a FCB in Sweden, and the study emphasizes a comparison between farmers selling to FCBs 
and to IOFs. It should, though, be recognized that the study has a value also from a theoretical 
perspective. It may be the first study ever made where farmers’ behavior is investigated with 
the use of a combination of transaction cost theory and socio-psychological theory.  
 
It should be noted that this study concerns only one single stage in the value chain for meat. 
How the meat is processed and sold is outside the scope of the study. The study is focused on 
pig farmers’ behavior. No other types of animals are included. The pig farmers to be included 
in the study are those who produce pigs for slaughter. Other categories are excluded, i.e. those 
who produce piglets to be sold to other farmers.  
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1.4 Outline  
 
A brief introduction about the pig slaughtering industry in Sweden is available in the 
following chapter. The subsequent Chapter 3 comprises an account of the two theoretical 
bases of the study. In the end of Chapter 3 a number of hypotheses are suggested. Chapter 4 
presents the methodology of the study with both data collection and methodological issues. 
The findings of empirical study are valid in Chapter 5. The analyses in Chapter 6 are linked to 
prior studies about farmers’ choice of trading partners. The follows Chapter 7 where the 
findings are discussed and finally some conclusions are drawn in Chapter 8. 
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2 The pig slaughter industry in Sweden 
 
Sweden became a member of the EC (European Community) in 1995. Since then the Swedish 
pig slaughter business has experienced a long period of depression. This can be perceived 
from a series of dramatic changes (such as the population of pig farmers, the production 
volumes of pigs, the mergers and acquisitions of the slaughterhouses). It seems that these 
changes have speeded up the structural adjustment in Swedish pig slaughter industry, hence 
these should be thoroughly introduced and analyzed in this chapter.  
 
 
2.1 The production and slaughtering of pigs 
 
Since 1995 the number of holdings with fattening pigs has decreased by 76 per cent or 6,300 
holdings and the breeders of piglets have decreased by 82 per cent or 5,600 holdings (Internet, 
SJV 1, 2008). At present, roughly 6,000 farmers are running the pig production business. 
Most of them have herds of less than 100 animals. Despite this small number of slaughter pigs 
that are raised by these producers, there is a trend towards large scale pig producers. This shift 
implies that large holdings with more than 500 pigs are dominating the sector of pig 
production in Sweden. 
 
In June 2008, about 1.61 million pigs were raised in Sweden, including 974,000 breeding and 
fattening pigs and 465,000 piglets (See Appendix 1). The pig production in Sweden is 
geographically concentrated to the south with almost one-third of the pigs in Scania (Skåne), 
the most southern county (Anon., 2008). 
 
Moreover, the reduction of pig production in Sweden can be observed by the comparisons of 
pig numbers in recent years (Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1. The numbers of fattening pigs and piglets in Sweden (1995-2007) 
Source: SCB (Statistics Sweden), 2008 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of fattening pigs has decreased by 285,000 (or 22 %) and 
the number of piglets fall more than 30% in Sweden during the 12 years. 
 
The number of pigs has decreased as well since 2007. Fattening pigs decreased by 41,000 
animals between 2007 and 2008, corresponding to 4 percent (Internet, SJV 2, 2008). This 
indicates that the reduction of fattening pigs during that period is even more rapid than before. 
Furthermore, since 2007 sows and boars decreased by close to 18,000 or 10 per cent (ibid). 
Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the downward trend in the production of fattening pigs 
continues.  
  
It is notable that the decrease of the number of pigs is less significant than the reduction of pig 
farmers. Hoffmann and Andersson (1997) point out that this difference is partly attributable to 
a rapid structural adjustment in the sector of Swedish pig production; one category of pig 
farmers choose to expand the herd size in order to obtain an economically rational production 
unit, the other category of pig farmers, on the other hand, choose to decrease the herd size, or 
abandon their businesses, while to a larger extent relying on off-farm income.  
 
The rapid fall of the number of pig farmers results in a drop of the volumes of slaughtered 
pigs, although the drop is not that obvious as comparing with the fall of pig farmer population.  
However, the pig slaughtering volumes in recent year is quit stable, which can be observed by 
comparing the volumes of slaughtered pigs (around three million pigs each year) from 2006 to 
2008 (See Appendix 2). The constant volumes of slaughtered pigs in recent years are also 
exhibited in Figure 2: the volumes of slaughtered pigs are almost in the same scale from 2005 
to 2008(between 20,000 tons and 24,000 tons monthly).  
16
20
24
28
jan feb mar apr maj jun jul aug sep okt nov dec
2005 2006 2007 2008
1 000 ton
 
Figure 2. The volumes of pig slaughtering monthly in Sweden (2005-2008) 
Source: SJV (the Swedish Board of Agriculture), 2008 
 
To conclude; the market structure of the Swedish pig production can be characterized as a 
typical concentration model with the strategy of cost reduction. There are several reasons for 
the trend towards large scale production of pigs for slaguthering. The EU (European Union) 
membership brought a halt to the protective agricultural policy. The protectionism policy 
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towards Swedish meat industry did not exist any more. The changed government policy and 
the EU membership have contributed to opening the Swedish meat market. The following 
import competition resulted in a lower price for the pigs for slaughtering, and it enhanced the 
competitive pressure to reduce costs for Swedish pig farmers, especially for the small scale of 
pig farmers. This could be used to explain why so many pig farmers quitted pig raising since 
1995. The tradition of cooperatives also contributed to the concentration within the Swedish 
pig production industry. The competition pressure forced those cooperative slaughter firms to 
reduce their costs, and their general strategies are that of closing smaller production units and 
increasing the capacity in the larger plants. This strategy has led to a more concentrated 
distribution of the pig for slaugtering. Moreover, the application of this strategy resulted in a 
change in the Swedish slaughter industry. 
 
 
2.2 The pig slaughter business and various slaughterhouses 
 
As it has been mentioned above, the structural adjustment of pig production in Sweden 
generates a highly concentrated market for Swedish pig slaughter business. No doubt, this 
business is dominated by Scan AB. It comprises four major plants (Kristianstad, Skara, Visby 
and Uppsala) with the shares 37.5%, 21.4%, 3.1% and 1.1% of slaughtered pigs during the 
first six months of 2008. This means that Scan AB has slaughtered around 63 % of the pigs of 
the whole Sweden during that period. The residual volume is handled by IOF slaughterhouses 
with various shares (See Appendix 3).  
 
Originally, Scan AB was a traditional farmer cooperative, Swedish Meats, which was 
established in 1999 as a merger between slaughter co-operative apex organization 
Slakteriförbundet, the slaughtering parts of dairy cooperative Norrmejerier and the industrial 
parts of Skanek, Scan Farmet, Scan Norrland (Nilsson cited in Karlsson et al., 2008). After 
this merger, Swedish Meats became the dominant cooperative firm with 17,400 farmer 
members in the Swedish slaughter industry. 
 
Although Swedish Meats dominated the Swedish slaughter business, its unsuccessful 
operations resulted in large financial deficits of the cooperative. Due to the demand for new 
capital, Swedish Meats sold itself to a Finnish corporation LSO Foods in the beginning of 
2007. HK Ruokatalo changed its name into HK Scan Group and formed a new company 
called Scan AB incorporating the business of Swedish Meats, to run the slaughterhouses and 
the marketing activities in Sweden. The contracts that pig farmers had with the former 
cooperative Swedish Meats were transferred to Scan AB. (ibid) 
 
Swedish Meats, however, does not disappear from the Swedish slaughter industry. It now acts 
as an intermediary between Swedish farmers and Scan AB. This means that many former 
members of Swedish Meats until the last of June 2009 have an “obligation” to deliver their 
animals to Scan AB. (ibid) 
 
Another task of Swedish Meats is to manage its 12.3% of the shares in HK Scan. This implies 
that the members of Swedish Meats still have a collective ownership of the HK Scan. The 
remainder of the equity capital of HK Scan is owned by a Finnish cooperative LSO Foods and 
the Helsinki Stock Exchange. As there are two categories of stocks of HK Scan, one stands 
for the majority of equity shares and the other represent the majority of the votes. LSO Foods 
has a minority of the equity shares (33% of the shares in HK Scan) and a majority of votes 
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(73% of the votes), whereas the Helsinki Stock Exchange has a majority of equity shares but a 
minority of the votes.  
 
Swedish Meats also appoints one regular member and one call-in member of the board in HK 
Scan (of five totally) and three regular members (of nine totally) of the board in Scan AB. The 
board member distributions reflect that the farmers’ interests and rights can be still 
represented by these board members from Swedish Meats, even if they are not the majority.  
 
Except for Scan AB, two of the largest IOF slaughter firms (Ugglarps Slakteri and KLS 
Livsmedel) had slaughtered 7% and 5.4% of pigs in the first half year of 2008 (See Appendix 
2). Both of them are located in the South of Sweden and owned by the largest Danish 
slaughter cooperative Danish Crown, which is the largest exporter in global meat market with 
a turnover of DKK 47 billion in the finical year 2007/08 (Stampe & Aunbol , 2008). 
 
Danish Crown has already offered the Swedish market a strong product range, and the 
takeover of Ugglarps Slakteri and KLS add to this strength. Furthermore, the takeovers also 
strengthen the competition among the various slaughterhouses in the Swedish slaughter 
market. Especially in Southern Sweden, the acquisition of the Ugglarps creates a strong 
regional network of pig producers, and it enables the slaughtering of the Swedish pigs in the 
local slaughterhouse. Since the location of the Ugglarps is also the primary market of Scan’s 
biggest plant – Scan Kristianstad – the competition between the two types of slaughterhouses 
(IOF and FCB) becomes even harder in Scania.  
  
While Scan AB is the largest player on the Swedish pig slaughter market and Danish Crown 
(Ugglarps and KLS) is clearly number two. There are also a large number of other slaughter 
firms. Some of them are located in the most intense pig producing regions such as 
Västergötland, i.e. Skövde slakteri and Dalsjöfors. In Hallandia, also a region with a large 
production of pigs, Ginsten is a local slaughterhouse.  
 
Obviously, Scania is the largest producing region in Sweden, and this region is dominated by 
Scan AB (a FCB) and Ugglarps (a subsidiary of the Danish cooperative Danish Crown, run as 
a profit-maximizing firm, i.e. as an IOF). This implies that Scania should be chosen as the 
region, where the empirical study is to be conducted.  
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3 Theoretical framework  
 
FCBs are likely to share ideologies and characteristics with agricultural cooperatives since the 
agricultural cooperatives are one of the common types of FCB. As the only FCB in Sweden, 
Scan AB has been transformed from an agricultural cooperative. Hence it can be assumed that 
the theories or concepts which are used to assess the suitability of the agricultural cooperative 
have the same function to explain the existence of FCBs, at least in the case of the Swedish 
slaughter industry. This assumption is presented here and most of the theoretical arguments in 
this chapter are based on the research on agriculture cooperatives. For this sake, one should 
keep in mind the basic notions or conceptions between FCBs and cooperatives are no 
differences, even though Scan has a unique ownership form. 
 
 
3.1 Transaction cost theory 
 
Most of the prior studies concerning Swedish pig farmers’ choice of buyers have a focus on 
comparing the differences between the cooperatives and IOFs (e.g. Jonsson, 1995; Falhlbeck, 
1996; Lind & Åkesson, 2005). The main argument of these studies is that pig farmers are 
likely to consider trading with a cooperative slaughterhouse to reduce their transaction costs 
and thereby increase their total revenues. Pig farmers tend to regard cooperative 
slaughterhouses as trustworthy and less risky trading partners compared to IOFs. It also 
assumes that the low transaction costs of trading with cooperative slaughterhouses are the 
main explanation to why so many pig farmers have delivered their animals to their 
cooperative slaughterhouses. However, the structure of the Swedish slaughter industry has 
changed due to the transformation of Scan. Based on the contextual relationship of Swedish 
Meats and Scan AB, as well as the theoretical arguments of different transaction costs 
between delivering to cooperative slaughterhouse and IOF slaughterhouse, it is likely that 
farmers’ transaction costs in relation to the slaughterhouses pose a reasonable explanation of 
pig farmers’ choice of trading partner. 
 
 
3.1.1 A historical approach of transaction cost theory 
 
As one of the most important concepts of New Institutional Economics, transaction cost 
theory has begun to take shape in recent decades. A famous article written by Coase (1937) 
can be seen as the starting point of transaction costs concept. He questions “why firms exist”, 
which is argued to depend on transaction costs. The question is why some transactions occur 
in the context of a hierarchy, instead of taking part in an open market. Transaction cost 
economics (TCE) tries to explain the specific structure of a business organization, most 
importantly to explore why vertical integration exists.  
 
However, the term “transaction costs” can not be found in Coase (1937, p. 390), instead, he 
uses “the cost of using the price mechanism” as follows: 
 
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of 
using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of “organising” production through the price 
mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are. This cost may be reduced but it 
will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information. The costs of 
negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes 
place on a market must also be taken into account. 
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Transaction costs are the costs of collecting information, negotiation and concluding 
contracts. The costs not only include the capital used, but also the time and effort. Because of 
the wide range of transaction activities when doing business, it is difficult to measure the 
transaction costs. Another difficulty is to delineate the boundary of various kinds of 
transaction costs because each kind of transaction has its specific cost. Many researchers 
attempt to solve the boundary problem by establishing a fundamental definition of transaction 
costs. Ollila (1989, p. 153) considers that “the transaction costs are the costs of all activities 
of gathering and processing information, negotiating contracts, administering, monitoring the 
exchange and solving possible deputes”. His definition is even broader than that of Coase. 
Cheung (1983) perceives that information is one of the most important causes of transaction 
costs. In the field of TCE, the contributions of Williamson must be emphasized. Although his 
contributions are based on Coase’s concepts, they are distinctive when comparing with other 
scholars’ researches.  
 
 
3.1.2 Williamson’s assumptions of TCE 
 
TCE is associated with Williamson’s work. His concept is regarded as the most systematical 
tool to analyze the costs which exists in the transaction activities between sellers and buyers. 
Williamson’s perspective is based on three behavioral assumptions. He assumes that humans 
are boundedly rational, opportunistic and risk neutral. 
 
According to Williamson (1985, p. 45), “bounded rationality is the cognitive assumption on 
which transaction cost analysis relies”. Bounded rationality mainly refers to the fact that 
people have both cognitive constraints and limited knowledge to process information. 
Normally, not all applicable information is available for the decision-makers due to the 
limited cognition and knowledge. It is also difficult for decision-makers to accurately work 
out all consequences depending on the information that they have. Another factor regarding 
bounded rationality is that people cannot foresee the alternative actions and reactions. For 
example, no matter how knowledgeable a manger might be, she or he cannot figure out all the 
possible consequences of her or his action. This is partly because the competitors’ behavior is 
not a controllable variable for the manger. 
 
Bounded rationality is the comparative assumption for another theoretical assumption, 
namely utility maximization; firms attempt to maximize profits, for example. Since 
Williamson stresses both production costs and transaction costs, he envisions production 
costs as the costs of building and running an “ideal” machine, while transaction costs are 
costs to ensure the machine works well, such as maintenance costs. In economics, the ideal 
machine would be a perfectly efficient market. The rationality of sellers and buyers within the 
market can directly influence the cost level through transactions. How people behave in a 
certain circumstance can be used to estimate whether their actions are rational. Simon (1957) 
argues that the term of “satisfying behavior” is more appropriate than maximization to 
explain human actions and replacing maximization with satisfying behavior is an essential 
step in the application of the principle of bounded rationality. Williamson (1996, p. 351), 
however, points out that “even granting that ‘satisfying’ is more descriptively accurate that 
maximization, satisfying is also a cumbersome concept and is difficult to model”. Notably the 
bounded rationality assumption is widely associated with psychology as well as two other 
assumptions – opportunism and risk neutrality. 
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The assumption of opportunism is defined by Williamson (1985, p. 47) as “self-interest 
seeking with guile”. It refers to the possibility that human beings will behave in a self-
interested way with guile, because people are not “perfectly rational” due to the conclusion of 
the first assumption (bounded rationality). The opportunism assumption is also connected to 
people’s behavior. Human being may not be entirely honest and reliable about their intension. 
Sometimes one might put pressure on another party relying on her or his comparatively 
advantageous position. Williamson concludes that not all people will act opportunistically all 
of the time. He merely assumes that someone does and has a room to act opportunistically 
some of the time, and it is difficult to find out who is opportunist and who is not in advance. 
 
Williamson’s last behavioral assumption is risk neutrality, which is between risk aversion and 
risk seeking. According to Aoki (1984), risk neutrality indicates that decision makers are 
indifferent between certain and uncertain, returns as long as the expected value of the 
uncertain returns is equal to that of the certain returns over the longer term. A number of 
critics have challenged the risk neutrality assumption but it has been well established that 
people have varying risk preferences. Even Williamson (1985, p. 389) acknowledges that 
people’s risk preferences "for some purposes can be of utmost importance", nevertheless he 
accepts risk neutrality as an assumption. 
 
These behavioral assumptions create the theoretical basis of TCE, but in themselves they are 
not the explanation of why firms will integrate vertically, because they are the natural 
characteristics of human being. The most influential explanation of transaction cost theory is 
the three dimensions that are formulated by Williamson.  
 
 
3.1.3 Three dimensions of transactions  
 
Williamson’s dimensions or variables can be used to characterize any transaction in the 
economic life. Transactions may involve specific or non-specific assets; have high or low 
uncertainty and can be frequent or rare. These three dimensions also determine the transaction 
costs level in a market or a hierarchy. When the decision makers attempt to make the decision 
about whether to integrate vertically, these variables should be taken into account.  
 
Asset specificity is particularly important in order to understand vertical integration. 
Williamson (1985, p. 55) says that:  
 
Asset specificity refers to durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular 
transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by 
alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated, and the specific 
identify of the parties to a transaction plainly matters in these circumstances, which is to say that 
continuity of the relationship is valued, whence structural and organizational safeguards arise in 
support of transactions of this kind, which safeguards are unneeded (would be the source of 
avoidable costs) for transactions of the more familiar neo-classical (nonspecific) variety.  
 
This means that the assets ought to be valuable in the context of a specific transaction. Thus, 
transaction costs would be reduced by vertical integration. In another word, the transaction 
costs are likely to be lower with vertical integration if the transactions involve highly specific 
assets. In addition, the specific assets are widely associated with various investments. Four 
types of asset specificity are summarized by Joskow (1988, p. 106) as follows. 
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1) Site specificity: the buyer and seller are in a “cheek-by-jowl” relationship with one another, 
reflecting ex-ante decisions to minimize inventory and transportation costs. Once sited, the assets in 
place are highly immobile. 
 
2) Physical asset specificity: when one or both parties to the transaction make investments in 
equipment and machinery that involve design characteristics specific to the transaction and which 
have lower values in alternative uses. 
 
3) Human asset specificity: Investments in relationship-specific human capital that often arise 
through a learning-by-doing process.  
 
4) Dedicated assets: General investments by a supplier that would not otherwise be made but for 
the prospect of selling a significant amount of product to a particular customer. If the contract were 
terminated prematurely it would leave the supplier with significant excess capacity. 
  
Similarly, Shelanski and Klein (1995)  describe the specific assets as a variety of relationship-
specific investment, which including both specialized physical and human capital, alone with 
intangibles such as R&D and the specific knowledge or “capabilities” of the firms. 
 
The dimension of uncertainty is closely related with a traditional “risk-uncertainty” 
perspective, as Williamson puts it. The uncertainty is also about the difficulty of foreseeing 
the consequences that might occur during the process of transactions. If a transaction needs 
more time to be complete, the uncertainty might increase. Another reason for uncertainty is 
information asymmetry. For instance, the buyers do have more information or knowledge of 
the market than the suppliers. This might lead to opportunistic behavior on the part of buyers. 
How do the suppliers trust the information which the buyers provide to them? How do the 
suppliers know that, having come to an agreement, the buyers won’t try to renegotiate the 
contract at some future time? 
 
Uncertainty is associated with bounded rationality. Because of people’s cognitive constraints 
and the complicated world, they are facing the danger which comes from the uncertainty. For 
example, lack of information about the alternative buyers in the market may lead to profit loss 
for the suppliers. 
 
The last dimension is transaction frequency. According to Williamson’s concept, if someone 
invests in transaction specific assets in her or his own firm and the transaction with another 
firm is much frequent, there is a high risk of opportunistic behavior from another firm. In the 
same way, Anderson and Schmittlein (1984, p. 388) point out that “for rarely occurring 
transactions, loss from opportunism and inflexibility are likely to be lower than the integrated 
firm’s incremental overhead. As a transaction recurs more frequently, however, integration 
becomes more desirable since potential losses from not integrating outweigh the overhead 
costs of integration.” 
 
Transaction cost theory is often applied to understand the arrangement of horizontal and 
vertical integration in the agricultural sector. According to Fahlbeck (1996), cooperatives can 
be seen as a form of vertical co-ordination between two stages in the agricultural production 
chain. For this sake, Scan AB can be viewed as a vertical co-ordination between pig 
production and meat processing in the Swedish slaughter industry. Notably, no matter how 
the Swedish slaughter industry changes, the main focus of the slaughter business is always on 
the vertically integrated slaughterhouses (such like Scan). Hence more attention is paid to 
explore the relationship between transactions cost theory and vertically integrated 
slaughterhouse in next section.  
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3.2 A prior study of Swedish slaughter business 
 
Most often, the arguments concerning vertically integrated organizations are closely related 
with transaction cost theory, especially in the case of the Swedish slaughter business. As it 
has been mentioned in the beginning of last section, the differences regarding farmers’ 
transaction costs have been examined by a number of empirical studies. Among them, 
Fahlbeck (1996) can be seen as a strong support for this study due to the similar research 
objective (the determinants of Swedish pig farmers’ choice of trading partner) and the same 
theoretical basis (transaction cost theory).  
 
In Fahlbeck’s study, two hypotheses concerning farmers’ different transaction costs are 
formulated and finally tested by a survey. This survey is to compare the transaction costs 
between the farmers’ delivering to a cooperative slaughterhouse and the farmers trading with 
an IOF slaughterhouse, namely “co-op farmers” and “IOF farmers”. 
 
 
3.2.1 The assumption about farmers’ asset specificity  
 
Fahlbeck’s first hypothesis focuses on the “asset specificity” dimension of transaction costs. 
In the agricultural sector, specific assets can be characterized as the initial investments that 
farmers have made for specific farming purpose, and the costs of these specific investments 
are regarded as sunk costs. Once the investment decision is made, some assets might be 
immobile or fixed for certain farming purpose and the costs for these assets are sunk. Even 
though not all specific investments are sunk, the salvage value of these assets can be very low 
for some other reason.  
 
According to the first hypothesis in Fahlbeck’ study, farmers trading with cooperatives ought 
to have more specific asset, i.e. more investments of a sunk cost character, than farmer trading 
with IOFs. The idea of this hypothesis comes from Williamson’s analysis of asset specificity 
principle, that is, a high share of specific investments within the total assets are more likely 
result in vertical integration. Specific assets can be various for pig farmers. To test the 
differences between the two groups of pig farmers (“IOF farmers” and “co-op farmers”), three 
dimensions of specific assets have been investigated by Fahlbeck. 
 
The site specificity dimension is tested by the questions of possibilities to trade with more 
than one slaughterhouse and distances to the slaughterhouses. In general, the data support the 
first hypothesis. Co-op farmers’ choices are far less than IOF farmers, and they also have a 
long distance to alternative slaughterhouses. Besides the location constraint, the co-op 
farmers’ ideology makes it impossible for them to trade with an IOF slaughterhouse. 
However, the results cannot represent the situation in whole Sweden due to the large density 
of slaughterhouses in the sample region. 
 
Human asset specificity concerns the parameters of pig farmers’ education and working 
experience. A higher degree of investments in human capital of co-op farms gives weak 
support for the first hypothesis, because the difference between the two groups of big farmers 
is not significant. 
 
Physical asset specificity is to test pig farmers’ opinions about their fixed assets. The result 
from the investigation shows that modern livestock buildings are more popular among co-op 
farmers, which means that more capital has been invested in the buildings and equipments by 
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co-op farmers. The investigation also identifies that co-op farmers have fewer possibilities to 
write off their assets. This might result in the situation where co-op farmers are more “locked 
in” on their farms. The most important finding in association with the first hypothesis is that 
most co-op farmers do not think they will get the full value when selling assets. This finding 
strongly supports the theoretical arguments, “farmers have a high degree of sunk costs ought 
to have higher incentives to safeguard such resources by becoming members of a jointly-
owned farmers’ cooperative” (Fahlbeck, 1996. p. 16).  
 
Fahlbeck acknowledges that even the support of the theoretical validity (i.e. transaction cost 
determinants to vertical integration of farmers in processing cooperatives) is not that strong, at 
least no empirical finding is available for challenging his first hypothesis.  
 
 
3.2.2 The assumption about the cooperatives can lower transaction costs 
 
Fahlbeck’s second hypothesis is closely related to the first one. It assumed that if co-op 
farmers are more sensitive to their specific assets compared to IOF farmers, farmer co-
operatives should be regarded as a mean to lower transaction costs. The first investigation 
concerns the pig farmers’ conceptions about the safety and transaction costs to trading with 
co-operative slaughterhouses and IOF slaughterhouses. No surprise, most co-op farmers 
believe that trading with cooperative slaughterhouses is safer than trading with IOF 
slaughterhouses. An interesting finding is that the majority of IOF farmers also see co-
operative slaughterhouses as safer trading partners. This strongly supports the theoretical 
argument about transaction costs (e.g. the co-operative membership can work as a safeguard 
against possible opportunism behavior). As a consequence, co-op farmers’ safeguard attitude 
ought to reduce the transaction costs of trading with their own cooperative slaughterhouses, 
such as contact costs, contract costs and enforcement costs. In relation to the safeguard issue, 
a risk premium arises among the co-op pig farmers. To balance the risk premium costs, IOF 
slaughterhouses will pay more for the animals to pig farmers compared to co-operative 
slaughterhouses. 
 
 
3.2.3 The limitations and further research possibilities of the prior study 
 
Fahlbeck’s study can be described as a “bridge”, which builds up a connection between the 
two types of theory in this study. The contributions of Fahlbeck’s study are important for this 
study but some limitations should not be ignored before it comes to the other type of theory. 
One may doubt if his findings are applicable to explain the current situation in relation to pig 
farmers’ transaction costs. Furthermore, it seems interesting to question that is there any other 
variable likely to determine farmers’ transaction costs except the transaction dimensions. 
These limitations, on the other hand, provide a good opportunity for this study to perform a 
further research. Hence the intention of this study is partly based on these further research 
possibilities.  
 
a) The appearance of the “new” suppliers – “FCB farmers” 
To test farmers’ transaction costs, “co-op farmers” and “IOF farmers” have been chosen as 
two groups of research samples by Fahlbeck. Since only cooperative slaughterhouses and IOF 
slaughterhouses were available to the pig farmers in that time, the suitability of the sample 
choice should not be questioned. The pig farmers’ current choices, however, are different than 
before, because the cooperative slaughterhouse has been replace by a FCB (Scan AB). In 
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other words, Swedish pig farmers’ current alternatives of slaughterhouses are in between the 
FCB and the IOF slaughterhouses.  
 
It supposes that the “FCB farmers” trading with Scan AB are the former members of Swedish 
Meats. Due to the ownership change of Scan, the perceived transaction costs of “FCB 
farmers” may be different as compared to trading with the former cooperative. Hence how 
“FCB farmers” consider their transaction costs ought to be investigated, in comparison with 
the transaction cost of the “IOF farmers” who are trading with IOF slaughterhouses.  
 
b) The weak supports from transaction cost theory 
Based on Williamson’s arguments, the three transaction dimensions (asset specificity, 
uncertainty and transaction frequency) can be seen as the variables which may determine 
farmers’ transaction costs. Nevertheless, only the asset specificity variable has been examined 
and the other two variables (uncertainty and transaction frequency) have not been taken into 
account in Fahlbeck’s study. This means that asset specificity is the only criterion to assess 
farmers’ transaction costs.  
 
It seems that Fahlbeck’s choice in relation to the transaction dimensions is reasonable since 
the theoretical argument implies that the dimensions of uncertainty and transaction frequency 
are controlled by the asset specificity. But whether or not this argument fits to the case of 
Swedish slaughter business is unknown. Due to the weak empirical supports from the 
variables of uncertainty and frequency, Fahlbeck’s conclusion (i.e., transaction costs is 
determinant when pig farmers choice their trading partners) seems not that reliable. Therefore, 
uncertainty and frequency ought to be involved in the investigation of pig farmers’ transaction 
costs. 
 
c) The absence of behavioral theory 
The structural adjustment of Swedish slaughter industry creates a lot of challenges and 
choices for all IOF slaughterhouses and the former cooperative (Scan). For the IOF 
slaughterhouses, what kinds of strategies they should apply to compete with Scan? On the 
other hand, as the only FCB, how will Scan react and maintain its dominating poison in the 
Swedish slaughter industry? These questions may have a linkage with Fahlbeck’s discussion, 
that is, cooperatives are more likely to link with “ideology” or “reputation” since they are the 
specific characteristics of the cooperatives. He also points out that ideology and reputation 
will be formed during the process of mutual adaptation on both sides of the transaction. As a 
former cooperative, Scan AB may inherit some cooperative ideology and reputation, but no 
evidence shows that the former members’ attitudes and behavior toward Scan AB will remain 
the same.  
 
It should be remembered that Williamson’s transaction cost theory is based on behavioral 
assumptions, such as bounded rationality and opportunism. How slaughterhouses’ behave 
may influence pig farmers’ attitudes towards them. If the pig farmers are dissatisfied with the 
slaughterhouses, they may behave negatively. This might result in high transaction costs on 
behalf of the farmers in the process of transitions. Based on this account, a behavioral theory 
in the form of socio-psychology is necessary to be introduced to assess transaction costs in 
relation to pig farmers’ attitudes toward the alternative slaughterhouses.  
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3.3 Socio-psychological concepts 
 
This section aims at using a socio-psychological approach to interpret farmers’ behavior. 
Socio-psychology concerns how social phenomena affect people and how people interact with 
others. In economics, socio-psychological theory can be seen as a tool to analyze how 
business actors’ attitudes and behavior affect their decisions and actions. In this study, the 
main concern is how socio-psychological factors influence farmers’ decisions of choosing 
trading partners.  
 
 
3.3.1 Socio-psychological factors in relation to farmers’ perceptions  
 
A number of researchers have perceived that satisfaction is an essential issue when producers 
evaluate their trading partners. Producers’ satisfaction degrees can be expressed by their 
different attitudes toward their trading partners. In the case of agricultural transaction, 
satisfaction is also assumed as a crucial factor which is likely to determine with whom 
farmers prefer to do business. However, the condition of farmers’ satisfaction is not just about 
the economic benefits that they have obtained from the trading partners (i.e., a good price of 
their products), especially for the members of the agricultural cooperatives. The finding of 
Österberg and Nilsson (2009) shows that the single most important explanation to members’ 
satisfaction with their cooperatives is the members’ perception of their participation in the 
governance, and this factor is even stronger than the product prices. Despite the members’ 
perception of their participation in the governance, other cooperative values in relation to the 
membership issue must be considered by farmer members as well, such as trust, involvement 
and a spirit of solidarity and equity(e.g. Hakelius, 1996). These values or attitudes can also be 
viewed as the particular socio-psychological factors or variables which exist in the 
relationship between the members and the cooperatives.  
 
Golovina and Nilsson (2009)  conclude that such socio-psychological factors are vital 
especially in traditional organized cooperatives as the unallocated equity capital implies 
vaguely defined property rights. They also view these socio-psychological factors as informal 
institutions, for example trust, readiness to be involved in collective action and cooperative 
governance, positive attitude to solidarity, equity, democracy and liberty, are instrumental for 
the solution of common property problems. Without them, free-riding behavior, low 
involvement, and distrust in the management are likely, all of which are detrimental for 
cooperatives’ development.  
 
 
3.3.2 Farmers’ trust towards their trading partners 
 
In business, trust is the fundamental precondition for success. Nothing can destroy a 
relationship more completely than distrust. There are a number of ways to define trust. In 
general, trust is both about emotional and logical actions. Trust is also important in our social 
network. A definition of trust based on socio-psychological foundations is that “trust is a 
psychological state comprising the intentions to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). 
Moreover, Hansen et al. (2002) view trust as having cognitive and affective dimensions. 
According to them, cognitive trust is more objective in nature and is based on a rational and 
methodical process that results in a judgment that individual, group or organization is 
trustworthy, and affective trust is subjective in nature because it is based the moods, feelings 
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or emotions that one have concerning the perceived that one has concerning the perceived 
trustworthiness of an individual, group or organization. 
 
Farmers’ trust toward their alternative trading partners (cooperatives and IOFs) has been 
examined in many studies. The main arguments are based on the different objectives between 
cooperatives and IOFs, i.e., cooperatives provide benefits to their members (producers), while 
IOFs focus on the profit returns to investors (non-producers). Sykuta and Cook (2001) suggest 
this difference may create greater trust in the relation between producers and producer-owned 
agribusinesses than between producers and IOFs.  
 
The prior studies confirm that trust is more important for cooperative firms than IOFs. Shaffer 
(1987) asserts that trust makes or breaks a cooperative, in part because the contract between 
producer and the organization is more relational in cooperatives than in IOFs and because 
cooperative are generally more reluctant than IOFs to impose sanctions on their members. 
Similarly, Fulton and Giannakas (2001) claim how member commitment within a cooperative 
– which could be a manifestation of organizational trust – is affected by cooperative 
characteristics and affects cooperative performance. Moreover, James and Sykuta provide a 
linkage between trust and cooperative characteristics, and they argue that trust is related to 
typical cooperative norms such as equal treatment as well as to relative homogeneity within 
the membership (James & Sykuta, 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, members’ organizational trust is not only related with their membership, but 
also the trust within the leadership of cooperatives. Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell (2009) present 
how distrust within the leadership will create difficulties of operating and governing the 
cooperatives. As the cooperative business firm has to work on market condition, the 
management takes control (Bager, 1996). With passive and poorly informed members, 
management works autonomously from the members (Hogeland, 2006). The board of 
directors, being highly dependent on the CEO (Chief Executive Officer), loss in legitimacy in 
the eyes of the members (Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell, 2009).  
 
 
3.3.3 Member involvement in the cooperatives 
 
Another socio-psychological factor of cooperative members’ satisfaction is the level of 
members’ involvement of the membership. Involvement is a concept expressing individuals’ 
psychological attachment to a phenomenon. It is also a concept of sharing activities in a group 
or a community. Cooperative can be seen as the member-based community, farmer members 
should be involved into the daily activities of the cooperative, such as doing business with the 
cooperative, attending meetings, serving on committees as elected representatives, and 
recruiting other farmer to become members. Member involvement can be viewed as a specific 
characteristic or a basic ideology of the cooperative. This is also an essential difference 
comparing with IOFs, i.e., the possibilities of being involved in the capitalism firms is fairly 
small for the producers (farmers).  
 
The involvement issue, on the other hand, may generate a risk for cooperatives, that is, 
members’ dissatisfaction towards their cooperatives. The dissatisfaction might lead to the fail 
of cooperatives. The linkage between involvement and ethical attitude has been discovered. 
Zusman (1993) claims that if members’ ethical attitudes are too weak to support the 
cooperative enterprise, it is bound to fail sooner or later. Moreover, if members are excluded 
from the membership or their involvement in the cooperative is too low, they will feel like 
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outsiders. Therefore, they may not want to invest in the cooperative; they try to be free-riders; 
they do not control the management adequately, and so on (Cook, 1995; Holmström, 1999). 
 
A cooperative itself may result in a low involvement situation as well, especially when the 
cooperative becomes large and complex, the members have difficulties in keeping informed 
of the business and assessing what is happening in the firm (Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell, 
2009). Therefore, the cooperative members can not be a part of the cooperative. While there is 
a tendency that members consider their influnces in the cooperative are important to them. 
Hence, the conflicts between the reality and the expectation are likely to increase members’ 
dissatisfactions toward their cooperatives. 
 
 
3.3.4 Members’ participation in cooperative governance 
 
Members’ perception of their participation in the governance of cooperatives is the last socio-
psychological factor of members’ satisfaction. That is also the particular concept of 
cooperatives’ ideology. Members’ participation in cooperative governance is also related to 
the involvement issue of the cooperatives, but it is more focus on the members’ involvement 
within the leadership than the membership.  
 
For a cooperative to supply its members with the services that they demand, a well-
functioning member democratic governance system is important (Gray and Kraenzle, 1998; 
Bhuyan, 2007). According to the cooperatives’ ownerships (i.e., members are the owners of 
the cooperatives), the members should take control of the cooperatives through their selected 
representatives. It is important for the cooperatives to get interests from the farmers. 
 
However, the mechanism of member control may cause many problems for the cooperatives. 
Firstly, agency theory indicates that information asymmetry might result in the members have 
difficulties to make ex-post assessments of the boards’ and the managements’ performance 
(Österberg and Nilsson, 2009). Secondly, property rights theory explains that the control 
problems are aggravated when the principal is collective and the property rights are vaguely 
defined. Collective principal and vaguely defined property rights may lead to the free-rider 
behavior, which will reduce members’ desire of taking control and weaker members’ 
incentive of being involved in the governance of the co-operatives. Finally, the constraints of 
members’ ability and knowledge may be disastrous for the cooperative. The large size and 
different location of members might result in conflicting interests within the cooperatives’ 
membership. Because the management thus obtain few, unclear and conflicting signals from 
the membership there is a risk that neither the board of director nor the CEO can interpret 
what the members want them to do (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000; Hendrikse, 2007). 
 
Based on the accounts above, member control is increasingly problematic, especially in large 
cooperatives with diversified business activities and with large and heterogeneous 
membership (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001; Borgen, 2001). Hence, one may expect member 
control to be weak in many cooperatives (Hogeland, 2006). Rather management will take 
control. However, members have strong wishes to participate in the governance of the 
cooperative, because their profitability relies on the cooperatives’ success. This is the human 
natural that people don’t want others to decide their fates. Thus, if the management takes 
control and the business is unsuccessful, members’ commitment in the governance will 
become weaker, and the dissatisfaction toward the cooperatives tends to increase among the 
membership.  
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3.4 Theoritical conclusion and hypotheses 
 
The theoretical framework of this study is based on a larger number of previous studies. In 
these studies, farmers’ choice of trading partner have been examined by using either 
transaction cost theory or socio-psychology theory. Fahlback’s findings can be seen as 
somewhere in between transaction cost theory and socio-psychological concept, and therefore 
his findings are presented in the middle of the theoretical introduction as a connection 
between the two types of theories. 
 
In Fahlback’s study, Swedish pig farmers have been categorized into two groups “co-op 
farmers” and “IOF farmers” because the two groups of farmers have chosen to trade with two 
types of slaughterhouses which differ in ownership forms. However, is transaction costs still 
the determinant of farmers’ choice of trading partner after the farmer has experienced Scan’s 
ownership? Or to say; is there any other variable or factor that may influence farmers’ 
choices?  
 
Based on Williamson’s transaction costs concepts, if the three dimensions of transaction 
costs, on the one hand, can be used to interpret the transaction costs on behalf of farmers, 
these dimensions can be regarded as the variables that may determine farmers’ choice of 
trading partner. If the socio-psychological factors, on the other hand, have some effects on 
farmers’ perceived transaction costs, these factors are also assumed as the variables of 
farmers’ choices. To conclude; the combination of transaction cost theory and socio-
psychological concepts may generate six latent variables which may determine farmers’ 
transaction costs. They are: (1) farmers’ asset arrangements, (2) farmers’ transaction 
frequencies, (3) farmers’ perceived uncertainty of the transactions, (4) farmers’ trust or 
distrust towards their trading partners, (5) farmers’ degree of involvement, and (6) farmers’ 
influence on their trading partners. 
 
It seems that the relationship between the six latent variables and farmers’ transaction costs 
can be exhibited by Figure 3, where the plus signifies a negative impact on farmers’ 
transaction costs, the minus express a positive effect on the transaction costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The hypothesized relationship between the latent variables and transaction costs 
 
In the figure above, the end point of the arrows (the middle rectangle) represents the assumed 
determinant of farmers’ choice of trading partner – transaction costs. The upper three 
rectangles in the figure express the three latent variables which are based on transaction cost 
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dimensions. The lower rectangles, on the other side of the figure stand for another three latent 
variables in relation to socio-psychological concepts.  
 
According to Figure 3, a set of hypotheses with the aim of examining these latent variables in 
association with the two types of theories are suggested. Whether or not these latent variables 
have direct effects on farmers’ choices will be tested by comparing the differences between 
two groups of farmers (“FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”).  
 
 
3.4.1 Hypotheses regarding transaction cost theory 
 
As the first latent variable of farmers’ transaction costs, asset specificity dimension refers to 
the investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions. Many kinds of 
farmers’ investments can be characterized as specific assets, such as the investments of 
buildings and facilities for farming. These investments can also be viewed as sunk costs that 
cannot be recovered once they have been incurred. The different asset arrangements between 
“co-op farmers” and “IOF farmers” have been examined by Fahlbeck in his study. His 
findings have provided empirical support to the theoretical argument that “co-op farmers” 
have more specific assets than “IOF farmers”. Then, which group of farmers has more 
specific assets between “FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”? This question can be answered by 
comparing the different asset arrangements between the two groups of farmers, and therefore 
the first hypothesis suggests: 
 
H 1. “FCB farmers” have more transaction specific assets in their farming operations than 
“IOF farmers”. 
 
Traditional transaction cost theory claims that two other transaction cost dimensions 
(transaction frequency and uncertainty) are influenced by the dimension of asset specificity. If 
the farmers’ assets are set up for trading with a particular slaughterhouse, the transactions 
between the farmers and this slaughterhouse should be more frequent. Furthermore, the 
farmers’ specific assets arrangement and the frequent transactions with the slaughterhouse are 
like to create opportunistic behavior on the part of the slaughterhouse. Consequently, the 
opportunistic behavior may increase farmers’ perceived uncertainty of trading with the 
slaughterhouses. Based on these theoretical arguments, two following hypotheses are used to 
test if there are any differences in farmers’ transaction frequencies and farmers’ perceived 
uncertainty of trading with the slaughterhouses between the two groups.  
 
H 2. “FCB farmers” delivery larger volumes to the slaughterhouses than “IOF farmers”. 
 
H 3. “FCB farmers” experience more uncertainty in their relationship to the slaughterhouses 
than “IOF farmers”. 
 
Farmers’ transaction frequencies are likely to be reflected by the times that they deliver their 
animals to the slaughterhouses, but the number of deliveries are not suitable to be used to 
measure farmers transaction frequencies in this case. Instead, farmers’ delivery volumes are 
introduced in the second hypothesis. This is because the delivery volumes may represent 
farmers’ actual delivery frequencies in a more logical way. Suppose that a farmer has 
delivered more times to the slaughterhouse than the other farmer during a certain period, but 
the total delivery volume of this farmer is less than the other farmer in the same period, and 
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therefore it is plausible to conclude that this farmer has more transaction frequency than the 
other farmer. 
 
According to Figure 3, if “FCB farmers” are more sensitive to these three latent variables than 
“IOF farmers” (i.e., they have more specific assets, sell larger volumes and perceive more 
uncertainty on the part of trading partner, they may have more transaction costs than “IOF 
farmers”. Hence, the last hypothesis in this section can be expressed as: 
 
H 4. “FCB farmers” do have more transaction costs than “IOF farmers”. 
 
To conclude; there is a causality among the four hypothesis in relation to transaction cost 
theory, which is that the three transaction cost dimensions will determine farmers’ transaction 
costs. 
 
3.4.2 Hypotheses regarding socio-psychological concepts  
 
As H 4 suggests, if “FCB farmers” perceive that they have more transaction costs than “IOF 
farmers”, they must try their best to reduce their transaction costs and increase their 
profitability. Farmers suppose that Scan as a former cooperative, which still has a function of 
lowering their transaction costs. It also seems that Scan inherited cooperative ideology and 
characteristics which is very attractive for the farmers. “FCB farmers”, in consequence, have 
decided to deliver their animals to Scan. For this sake, farmers should take different attitude 
towards the slaughterhouses that they are delivering to. Then, socio-psychological concepts 
should be introduced to test the differences in farmers’ attitude towards the slaughterhouses 
between the two groups of farmers. 
 
The first latent variable associated with socio-psychological concepts is trust, since trust is 
essential for any kind of business relationship. It supposes that trust can lower farmers’ 
transaction costs in relation to the slaughterhouses, such as contact costs (the costs for 
maintaining the relationship between farmers and slaughterhouses), contract costs (the 
resources spent on contracting), and enforcement costs (the costs of executing contracts). The 
ownership difference between Scan and IOFs may create greater trust in the relation between 
“FCB farmers” and Scan than between “IOF farmers” and IOFs. If this is correct, “FCB 
farmers” should perceive more trust to Scan than IOF slaughterhouses. Hence, the first 
hypothesis in relation to farmers’ trust or distrust towards their trading partners is:  
 
H 5. “FCB farmers” perceive more trust to their trading partners, as compared with “IOF 
farmers”.  
  
Two other latent variables related to socio-psychological concepts are both about farmers’ 
participantion in the slaughterhouses. One related to farmers’ general involvement in the 
slaughterhouses. The other is more concern about farmers’ participantion in slaughterhouses’ 
governances. Both variables are particularly important for “FCB farmers” since these are the 
specific characteristics or basic ideologies of the former cooperative Scan. Moreover, the two 
concepts are also the essential differences between Scan and IOFs because the possibility of 
being involved in IOF slaughterhouse or participate in IOFs’ governances seems very difficult 
for IOF suppliers. If “FCB farmers” consider that they are excluded from Scan or their 
influences on Scan’s governance is too small, they are likely to behave negatively, such like 
try to be “free-riders”. This may generate more transaction costs on the part of farmers, such 
as investing more resources to contact with their suppliers, or devoting more energy to reach 
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agreements in contracts and enforce the contracts. Thus, Scan would have to create more 
opportunities for its suppliers to make them participate in the organization and as well the 
governance of the organization.  
 
Based on above analysis, the latent variable regarding the involvement issue is hypothesized 
as following. 
  
H 6. “FCB farmers” have higher involvement in their trading partners, as compared with 
“IOF farmers”.  
 
Since farmers’ participantion in slaughterhouses’ governance can be understood as if farmers 
have enough power to influence the slaughterhouses, the hypothesis associated with the last 
socio-physiological concept can be formulated as: 
 
H 7. “FCB farmers” have more influence on their trading partners, as compared with “IOF 
farmers” 
 
According to Figure 3, the three latent variables related to socio-physiological concepts have 
positive influences on farmers’ transaction costs. Then, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
Scan ought to lower farmers’ transaction costs; otherwise there is no point in the choices of 
“FCB farmers”. Therefore, the final hypothesis is available as: 
 
H 8. FCBs create lower transaction costs for the farmers than IOFs do.  
 
As can been seen in this section, all of the latent variables have been hypothesized as the 
determinants that may influence farmers’ transaction costs. Therefore, the two major aims of 
this study can be precisely stated as: (1) it is to empirically test if transaction cost theory are 
valid to assess the degree of farmers’ transaction cost and (2) if socio-psychological concepts 
can be used to explain the perceived difference in transaction costs between delivering to 
Scan and IOF slaughterhouses. To fulfill the two study aims, an empirical study should be 
conducted by comparing the data from both “FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”. If the 
hypotheses are supported by the empirical study, significant differences between the two 
groups ought to be found.  
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4 Methodology  
 
The methodology of the study is introduced as an independent chapter since it covers too 
much information which ought to be presented in details.  
 
 
4.1 Data collection 
 
An empirical research has been conducted in order to test the hypotheses. Relevant data has 
been collected from the pig farmers who are raising fattening pigs in Scania. These research 
samples have been chosen because both population and density of pigs in this region are 
relatively high (See Appendix 1), and this is also the region where actual competition between 
Scan and IOFs is most frequent1. 
 
Totally 36 questions with the aim of testing the hypotheses have been formulated into a 
questionnaire (See Appendix 4). On the basis of various kinds of objectives and functions of 
these questions, the questionnaire is divided into four parts. The question in the first part is 
used to define farmers’ identities, i.e., which slaughter business the farmers are trading with. 
The following two parts in the questionnaire are both formed by 12 questions which intend to 
investigate farmers’ general attitudes and experienced difference towards alternative slaughter 
businesses, but the questions in the third part more focused on gathering numerical data. 
Farmers’ background is investigated through the rest of the questions, which are formulated in 
the last part of the questionnaire, but not all of them are used to test the hypotheses, such as 
farmers’ age and gender. 
 
According to the information provided by Swedish Statistics, there are totally 664 pig farmers 
in Scania. Due to the demand of a large volume of data, the questionnaires have been sent to 
all of them. After the deadline of returning the questionnaires (two weeks later), 160 
responses have been received. But 42 farmers didn’t answer any question in the questionnaire 
because they stated that they had quitted raising pigs. After removing these inapplicable 
responses, the percentage of applicable responses is 17.8% (118 answers are applicable). But 
it is unconvincing to conclude that this fairly small sample size may represent the whole 
population of pig farmers in this region. To enlarge the volume of sample size, same 
questionnaires were sent to the 501 remainders2 who didn’t return the questionnaires before 
the first deadline. One week later, totally 101 questionnaires had been returned (82 of them 
were from the 501 remainders and the rests came from the farmers who didn’t return the 
questionnaires before the deadline), but 44 responses were still inapplicable. Hence, the final 
number of the useful answers is 175, which means that 175 research samples of this 
investigation can be used for further analysis.  
                                                          
1 Scan’s two biggest slaughterhouses (Scan Kristianstad and Scan Skara) and its major competitors (IOF 
slaughterhouses) Ugglarp Slakteri AB and KLS Livsmedel are all located in or nearby this region. 
2 The number of remainders who didn’t return their questionnaires before the deadline is 504, three of them 
called and said they have stopped to produce pigs, and therefore their names are removed from the remainders’ 
list. This is why the remainders are 501, but not 504. 
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4.2 Statistical techniques 
 
Since the data of this investigation is based on large volume of quantitative information, the 
quantitative approach is employed for investigating the relationships between the data and the 
hypotheses. The process of measurement is the key to the quantitative research because it 
provides the fundamental evidence whether there is any conflict between the data and the 
hypotheses. The data is mostly collected, analyzed, explained and presented by various kinds 
of statistical methods, and therefore statistical tests are chosen as the measure to make 
statistical decisions using the data in this study.  
 
According to the theory of scale types (Stevens, 1946), all measurements in science can be 
classified into four different types of scales, they were "nominal", "ordinal", "interval" and 
"ratio". Based on the scale of measurement, the data which gathered from the investigation 
can be categorized into two groups – categorical data (nominal and ordinal scales) and 
continuous data (interval and ratio scales). Categorical data having unordered or ordered 
scales are called nominal or ordinal scales, while continuous data having interval scales or 
both equal intervals and an absolute zero point are called interval or ratio scales (Internet, 
SRM 1,1997). Among the data of this investigation, a good example of nominal scale is 
farmers’ gender which the order of the categories is arbitrary. The Likert scale where there is 
a logical ordering to the categories can be seen as ordered scale. But no data can be 
characterized as interval scale or ratio scale. 
 
The reason of distinguishing data is that the statistical method is different in terms of the scale 
of measurement. Due to the characteristics of the two groups of experimental data in this 
investigation, chi-square test statistics is used to deal with the categorical data, and t-test 
statistics is suitable to compare the means of two groups of data, such as the distances to the 
slaughterhouses that farmers are trading with. 
 
 
4.2.1 Chi-square test 
 
“The chi-square test (X2) is the most commonly used method for comparing frequencies or 
proportions. It is a statistical test used to determine if observed data deviate from those 
expected under a particular hypothesis (Internet, SE 1, 2009). In this investigation, Person’s 
chi-square test is used to determine whether an association (or relationship) between the two 
groups (“FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”) in the 175 observed samples is likely to reflect a 
real association between the two group in the whole population of pig farmers. In the case of 
the two groups being compared by categorical data, the chi-square test can also be interpreted 
as determining if there is a significant difference between the two groups. 
 
To answer the question “is there any difference of a particular issue between the two groups”, 
the particular null hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1) that are based on the chi-
square test ought to be set.  
jijiH πππ =,0 :  (the distribution of frequency data between the two groups is associated 
with each other, no difference is observed) 
jijiH πππ ≠,1 :  (the distribution of frequency data between the two groups is not associated 
with each other, a significant difference is observed) 
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To test if the null hypothesis is true, the value of test statistic(X2) can be calculated by 
following formulas. ( )
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In this investigation, where 
X2= the test statistic that asymptotically approaches an X2distribution; 
r= the number of possible outcomes of “FCB farmers”; 
c= the number of possible outcomes of “IOF farmers”; 
Oi,j = an observed frequency of “FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”; 
An expected (theoretical) frequency Ei,j of “FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers” is 
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Note: ∑ =ck kiO1 , is the total number of observed samples within the group of “FCB farmers”, 
∑ =rk jkO1 ,  is the total number of observed samples within the group of “IOF farmers” and N is 
the total sample size. The number of degrees of freedom is equal to (r − 1) (c − 1). 
 
However, the value of X2 does not mean much on its own. It must be looked up in the chi-
square critical values in a table - chi-square table (See Appendix 5), the table shows the 
extent to which the association or relationship between the two groups might be caused by 
chance (i.e., the sample error). Hence, after the chi-squared test-statistic is computed by the 
expected and the observed frequencies, the probability of obtaining the observed difference 
(p-value) should be examined to test if the null hypothesis is true. 
 
The p-value (level of signification) that produced by chi-square test is equal to the probability 
of obtaining the observed difference between the two groups of samples. “Consequently, if 
the p-value is small the data support the alternative hypothesis. If the p-value is large the data 
support the null hypothesis. Conventionally (and arbitrarily) a p-value of 0.05 (5%) is 
generally regarded as sufficiently small to reject the null hypothesis (Internet, UWE 1, 2006). 
In other words, if the p-value associated with chi-square test is smaller than 0.05 (< 0.05), 
there is evidence to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative, i.e., there is evidence 
that the observed and expected frequencies between the two groups are significantly different 
at the significance level reported by the p-value. By contrary, if the p-value is larger than 0.05 
(> 0.05), there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis, and it should be concluded 
that there is evidence that the observed and expected frequencies between the two groups are 
not different.  
 
 
4.2.2 T-test  
 
Contrary to chi-square test, t-test (or student’s t-test) is commonly used to analysis continuous 
data. “The t-test assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically different from each 
other” (Internet, SRM 2, 2006). Since the research samples in this investigation have been 
categorized into two groups (“FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”), independent two-sample t-
test is appropriate to be employed to compare the means of the continuous data of the two 
groups.  
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Similar with chi-square test, t-test is also used to test a null hypothesis. But the null 
hypotheses associated with t-test and chi-square test are based on different assumptions. The 
null hypothesis of t-test assumes the mean values of the two groups of samples are equal. In 
this investigation, a suitable t-test null hypothesis with its alternative might be formulated as 
following. 
210 : ππ =H  (the means of continuous data between the two groups are equal, no difference 
is discovered)  
211 : ππ ≠H  (the means of continuous data between the two groups is not equal, significant 
difference is discovered)  
To examine the null hypothesis of t-test, the test statistic value of t-test can be calculated as by 
following formulas. 
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In this investigation, where 
21XX
S is estimator of the common standard deviation of the two 
groups of samples, it is defined in this way so that its square is an unbiased estimator of the 
common variance whether or not the population means are the same. In these formulas, n = 
number of samples, 1 = “FCB farmers”, 2 = “IOF farmers”. ‘n − 1’ is the number of degrees 
of freedom for either group, and the total sample size minus two (that is, n1 + n2 − 2 ) is the 
total number of degrees of freedom, which is used in significance testing. 
 
The method and process of testing the null hypothesis of t-test is almost the same with chi-
square null hypothesis test, i.e., calculating the t-value and examining the p-value. What 
might be different is that t-test has its own critical table – “t table”, which contains the critical 
t-values under different degrees of freedom and levels of significant (p-values).  
 
P-value associated with t-test or chi-square test can be calculated by many ways when the 
values of test statistics and freedom degrees are identified. But the calculation of p-values is 
very complicated; a computer package will be the most efficient way to do the appropriate 
calculations. Therefore, the professional software package for statistical analysis - Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is chosen to conduct the calculations of p-values and 
statistics tests in t-test and chi-square test. 
 
It should be noted that the t-test is used when sample sizes are small (ex., < 30), but with larger samples the Z-
test is used. Basically, the principle of these two tests is no different. When larger sample sizes are identified 
(such as this case) the t-test procedure gives almost identical p-values as the Z-test procedure. For this reason, 
there is no (direct) Z-test in SPSS, instead, t-test is available for comparing the means between the two groups of 
fairly large samples.  
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5 The empirical findings 
 
Before the data is processed by the computer software- SPSS, the sample sizes of the two 
groups of farmers (“FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”) ought to be identified, i.e., whom the 
175 farmers that provided useful answers are trading with? Based on this consideration, the 
question regarding farmers’ current delivery percentages to each slaughterhouse has been 
asked in the beginning of the questionnaire. Besides the 70 and 81 farmers who deliver all 
their animals to Scan and IOFs, the rest (24 farmers) choose to send their animals to both 
Scan and IOFs at the same time. Since the aim of this study is to investigate the differences 
between “FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”, the data which provided by the farmers trading 
with both Scan and IOFs should not be taken into account, even if their answers might inflect 
the differences between Scan and IOFs in a more direct way. Hence, the sizes of the two 
groups of samples (“FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”) are finally verified as 70 and 81. 
 
 
5.1 Statistical results of farmers’ asset specificity 
 
5.1.1 Human asset specificy 
 
Human asset specificity has been tested by the questions concerning farmers’ education and 
farmers’ devoted efforts on their farms.  
 
In the question regarding farmers’ education, farmers have been asked to report their highest 
completed education. According to the Swedish education system, farmers’ completed 
education is categorized into six levels. 
 
Table 1. Parameters of farmers’ education 
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value 
 Yes No  Yes  No   
Primary/secondary school 70 0 78 0 No difference* 
Agricultural high school 15 55 15 63 0.11 0.74 
High school 1 69 12 66 8.968 0.003 
After high school short education  17 53 12 66 1.855 0.173 
Agricultural collage/university 18 52 12 66 2.436 0.119 
Collage/university 5 65 6 72 0.016 0.899 
* The statistical results related to Primary/secondary school are not given, since the frequencies of the answer 
“No” in both groups are “0” which is meaningless in statistics.  
 
Chi-square test has been used to examine if farmers’ education between the two groups have 
any different in each education level. As can be seen in Table 1, only farmers’ answers 
concerning the education of high school differ significantly between the two groups, because 
the probability of obtaining the observed difference (p-value) is just 0.3% (0.003) which is far 
more less than the critical p-value 0.05. This means that there is enough confident to reject the 
null hypothesis which assumes that the two groups farmers have no difference in the 
education of high school. When comparing the frequencies between the two groups in such 
education, “IOF farmers” have a higher degree than “FCB farmers”. However, this difference 
cannot be viewed as a support that “IOF farmers” have a higher degree of investments in 
human capital. 
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Besides the education issue, farmers have also been asked about their time arrangement on 
farming and pig production respectively (i.e., how many percents of the working hours they 
spent on farming and pig raising).  
 
Table 2. Parameters of farmers’ time arrangement on farming and pig production 
  "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" t-value  p-value 
 N* Mean Std. Dev. N* Mean Std. Dev.   
Farming (%)  66 86.76 25.796 71 81.93 30.106 1.010 0.314 
Pig raising (%)  61 39.41 27.468 69 43.71 29.091 -0.863 0.390 
* “N” stands for the number of farmers who provided useful answers in each group; it can be also interpreted as 
the sample size of each group.  
 
On average, which group of farmers has consumed more time on farming and pig production 
is examined by t-test statistics. No important difference between the two groups is found 
because the two outcomes of p-values in Table 2 are larger than 0.05 (0.314>0.05, 
0.39>0.05).  
 
Since no important statistical difference is observed in both cases, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that there is no significant difference about farmers’ specific human asset between 
the two groups.  
 
 
5.1.2. Site specificity  
 
The site specificity dimension has been tested by asking farmers about the distance to the 
slaughterhouses that they are delivering to in the questionnaire.  
 
Table 3. Parameters of the distances between farms and slaughterhouses 
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" t-value  p-value 
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Distance(Km) 
69 77.62 35.946 70 115.56 102.657 
-2.916 0.005 
 
The useful answers related to this question have been reported by 69 “FCB farmers” and 70 
“IOF farmers”. According to t-test statistics, these answers are available to test the null 
hypothesis, which assumes that the average distance to the slaughterhouses between the two 
groups of farmers have no difference. As Table 3 shows, the probability of obtaining the 
observed difference (p-value) between the two groups is 0.005, which means that the 
possibility to accept the null hypothesis is extremely small (equal to 0.5%). Thus, there is 
enough confident to reject the null hypothesis and accept that the distances to slaughterhouses 
between the two groups of farmers is significant difference at a 99.5% (1-0.005) level. The 
mean difference between the two groups is 37.94Km (115.56-77.62), which indicates that 
“FCB farmers” have shorter distances to the slaughterhouses that they are delivering to than 
“IOF farmers”. Consequently, “FCB farmers” have more specific site assets than “IOF 
farmers”. 
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5.1.3 Physical asset specificity 
 
When it comes to physical asset specificity, two questions have been asked to the farmers. 
One considers the current conditions of farmers’ product facilities; the other concern is that 
whether or not farmers believe their investments would be paid back with a full value, in a 
situation where they sell their assets.  
 
Table 4. Parameters of farmers’ physical assets  
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value 
New Good Worn New Good Worn Product 
facilities 12 44 12 17 42 16 
1.140 0.566 
Yes No Don't know Yes No 
Don't 
know Investment 
payback 40 16 13 44 9 25 
 
5.409 
 
 
0.067 
 
 
In the questionnaire, farmers’ product facilities have been categorized into three degrees 
(“New”, “Good condition” and “Worn out”), while the answers about if farmers perceive that 
they can get the full value when selling assets are divided into three groups (“Yes”, “No” and 
“Don’t know”). To compare the frequencies of these categorical data between the two groups, 
chi-square test has been employed. 
 
Table 4 illustrates that the actual probability of obtaining the observed differences (p-values) 
in both cases is fairly large, as compared with the significant level of 0.05 (i.e., 0.566>0.05 
and 0.067>0.05). These outcomes of chi-square test inflect that there are no significant 
difference associated with farmers’ physical asset arrangement between “FCB farmers” and 
“IOF farmers”. 
 
 
5.2 Transaction frequency 
 
Farmers’ delivery volumes are the key criterion for evaluating their transaction frequency in 
the questionnaire. It assumes that farmers delivering larger volumes have more frequent 
transactions with the slaughterhouse, and therefore a question concerning farmers’ total 
delivery volumes in 2008 was asked to the farmers. 
 
Table 5. Parameters of farmers’ total delivery volumes in 2008 
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Delivery volumes  
27 24 12 5 39 17 16 6 
3.370 0.338 
 
Farmers’ total volumes of delivered pigs in 2008 are weighed by four scales with the values 
of 1: <500 pigs, 2: 500-3000 pigs, 3: 3000-6000 pigs, and 4: >6000 pigs. The p-value in Table 
5 is 0.338, which is larger than 0.05. Thus, farmers’ delivery volumes are not significantly 
different between the two groups in 2008. This means that there is no significant difference in 
farmers’ transaction frequencies between “FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”, at least in last 
year.  
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5.3 Uncertainty  
 
According to transaction cost theory, when information between producers and processors is 
asymmetric, opportunistic behavior on the part of processors occurs. Processors’ opportunistic 
behavior will increase producers’ perceived uncertainty to them. For the sake of examining if 
the phenomenon of information asymmetry also exists in the relationship between farmers 
and slaughterhouses, three questions have been asked in the questionnaire.  
 
In the first question, farmers are asked to report if they receive market and financial 
information from the slaughterhouses that they are delivering to. In the subsequent question, 
the farmers who perceive that they have gotten information from the slaughterhouses are 
requested to evaluate the received information, here a five-point Likert scale is used to 
categorize the answers related to information reliability, i.e., 1= very reliable, 2=reliable, 
3=neutral, 4=unreliable, and 5= very unreliable. In the last question, farmers are asked to 
compare the reliability of received information from Scan and IOFs directly.  
 
Table 6. Parameters of information access and information reliability 
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value 
N Yes No N Yes No Receiving 
information 69 54 15 78 43 35 
8.729 0.003 
Scan IOFs Don't know Scan IOFs Don't know More 
Reliable  23 16 30 4 53 19 
35.425 0.000* 
* The p-value is printed as 0.000 in SPSS. This should be interpreted as p< 0.001, and not be taken as exactly 0. 
 
According to Table 6, significant differences between the two groups are found in both 
questions. One is associated with the answers about if farmers receive information from the 
slaughterhouses that they are delivering to have a significant difference between the two 
groups (i.e., 0.003<0.05). There are more “FCB farmers” receive information from the 
slaughterhouse (78% “FCB farmers” receive information from Scan, while the percent of 
“IOF farmers” who receive information from IOFs is 55%). The other significant difference 
regarding information reliability is generated by farmers’ direct comparison between Scan 
and IOFs. It seems that IOF farmers’ answers create this difference, since the responders who 
perceive that Scan provides the most reliable information is very rare (5.3% in the whole 
group) but 23% of “FCB farmers” think IOFs provide the most reliable information to their 
suppliers.  
 
Table 7. Parameters of information reliability with scales 
 
Table 7 indicates that when farmers are requested to evaluate the received information from 
the slaughterhouses that they are delivering to, the answers give no significant difference 
between the two groups. However, if the neutral answers (scale 3) are not considered in this 
case, the differences with both groups will become more obvious. That is, majority of “FCB 
farmers” and “IOF farmers” perceive that the slaughterhouses that they are trading with 
provide much reliable information to them. 
 
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Information 
 Reliability 3 40 19 3 2 4 39 31 2 3 
2.466 0.65 
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5.4 Farmers’ trust or distrust towards the slaughterhouses 
 
As a crucial factor of socio-psychological concepts, farmers’ trust towards the slaughterhouse 
has been examined by comparing which type of slaughterhouse is more trustworthy between 
Scan and IOFs in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 8. Parameters of farmers’ trust toward the slaughterhouses 
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value 
Scan IOFs Don't know Scan IOFs Don't know More 
trustworthy 18 23 28 1 69 10 
46.176 0.000 
 
As can be seen in Table 8, the p-value associated with chi-square test should be interpreted as 
less than 0.001. This fairly small p-value denotes that the difference between the two groups 
is very significant. There are totally 80 “IOF farmers” who have answered this question, but 
only one of them considers that Scan is more trustworthy than IOFs. This finding, is of 
course, not surprising because these responders have actually chosen to trade with IOFs 
slaughterhouses. What may be more interesting is that there are also 23 “FCB farmers” 
believe IOFs is more trustworthy than Scan, but the number of “FCB farmers” who held the 
opposite opinions is just 18. Consequently, there is a dominating opinion that IOFs is more 
trustworthy than Scan in both groups of “FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers”. 
 
 
5.5 Farmers’ involvement in the slaughterhouses 
 
Whether or not farmers perceive that they have been involved in the slaughterhouses is not 
tested directly in the questionnaire. Instead, two questions concerning the importance and 
desirability for farmers to be involved in the slaughterhouses have been asked. If farmers 
perceive that the slaughterhouses’ survivals are important to their businesses, they may 
consider that it is necessary to be involved in the slaughterhouses. However, if farmers 
perceive that they have gotten bad treatment from the slaughterhouses, they may loss their 
interests to participate in the slaughterhouses’ activities.  
 
Based on the above consideration and assumptions, farmers have been asked which 
slaughterhouse’s survival is much important for their future production and which 
slaughterhouse treats them better than the other one.  
 
Table 9. Parameters of the involvement issue for the farmers 
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value
 Scan IOFs Don't know Scan IOFs Don't know   
Slaughterhouses’ 
survival 27 19 23 4 60 16 39.000 0.000 
Better treatment 15 20 34 2 70 7 55.075 0.000 
 
The answers in both questions point out that the differences between “FCB farmers” and “IOF 
farmers” are statically significant due to the extremely small p-values in Table 9.  
 
The frequency distributions in the first question indicate that the majority of farmers in both 
groups have perceived that the survivals of the slaughterhouse(s) which they are trading with 
is more important than the other(s).There are totally 79 farmers who believe that IOF 
  31 
 
 
slaughterhouses’ survivals are much important for their suppliers, but only 31 farmers 
perceive that Scan’s survival is much important for its suppliers. Due to obvious difference, it 
has enough confident to conclude that the involvement in the slaughterhouses is more 
important for “IOF farmers”, as compared with “FCB farmers”. 
 
In the second question, the frequency distributions express that farmers in both groups take 
the same attitude, that is, “IOF farmers” can get a better treatment from IOF slaughterhouses 
than what “FCB farmers” get from Scan. Therefore, it should be conclude that “IOF farmers” 
have more desirability to be involved in the slaughterhouses than “FCB farmers”. 
 
 
5.6 Farmers’ influence on slaughterhouses  
 
Whether farmers perceive that they have enough power to influence the slaughterhouses’ 
decisions have been tested by two questions. They are used to investigate farmers’ complaint 
times to their trading partners and the response times of these complaints, respectively. The 
aim of this investigation is to test which type of slaughterhouse has more concerns about 
farmers’ proposals (suggestions, questions and complaints). It assumes that the 
slaughterhouse that has more concerns about farmers’ proposals, farmers may perceive that 
they have power to influence this slaughterhouse’s decisions. 
 
Table 10. Parameters of complaint times and response times 
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" t-value p-value 
 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev.   
Complaint times 34 4.12 4.326 31 2.71 2.383 1.603 0.114 
Response times 34 0.85 1.374 31 2.03 1.958 -2.831 0.006 
 
The p-value (0.114) related to farmers’ compliant times in Table 10 indicates that there is no 
statistical difference between the two groups, even if “FCB farmers” complained more times 
than “IOF farmers” averagely (4.12>2.71). However, a significant difference in the response 
times between Scan and IOFs is observed due to the actual p-value is smaller than the critical 
p-value (0.006<0.05)  
 
The average response rates related to farmers’ complaints can be computed by the means of 
complaint times and response times which have been given in Table 10. The average 
responses rate in the group of “IOF farmers” is 82.17 %( 1.958/2.383), while only 31.8 %( 
1.374/4.326) of farmers’ complaints have been replied by Scan.  
 
 
5.7 Farmers’ transaction costs 
 
The data related with transaction costs is quite difficult to be gathered and measured by the 
questionnaire because farmers may be sensitive to relevant questions (i.e., farmers may think 
that this kind of questions are their business secrets). For this reason, only farmers’ general 
opinions related to three kinds of transaction costs (contact costs, contract costs and 
enforcement costs) have been asked in the questionnaire. It supposes that if the 
slaughterhouses are easier to be contacted, agree to a contract, and better at the contract 
enforcements, farmers’ costs will be in a low level.  
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Table 11. Parameters of farmers’ general attitudes toward transaction costs 
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value 
 Scan IOFs Don't know Scan IOFs 
Don't 
know   
Contact 19 17 33 1 67 11 56.544 0.000 
Contract 18 16 35 1 61 16 48.217 0.000 
Contract enforcement 18 16 35 4 45 29 22.793 0.000 
 
As Table 11 shows, all the answers associated with the three kinds of transaction costs give 
significant differences between the two groups due to the fairly small p-values (less than 
0.001). Both groups of farmers perceive that the slaughterhouse(s) which they are trading 
with is easier to be contacted and agree to a contract, and better at contract enforcement than 
other slaughterhouse(s). This perception, however, is accepted by more “IOF farmers” than 
“FCB farmers” due to the frequency distributions in all answers.  
 
This finding corresponds to the result of another question very well. That is, when farmers are 
requested to recommend a slaughterhouse to their friends, no “IOF farmers” recommended 
Scan since they have perceived the transaction costs is too high to trade with Scan. A more 
interesting observation in this question is that 63% of “FCB farmers” also recommend IOF 
slaughterhouses to their friends. 
 
 
5.8 Control variables  
 
Two control variables have been used to control the outcomes of this empirical study. They 
are farmers’ production capacities and farmers’ risk attitudes. These two control variables are 
chosen since they are likely to influence the empirical outcomes. If the two groups of farmers 
differ significantly on production capacities, one may suspect that some reported distinctions 
in farmers’ influences on the slaughterhouses are created by the size of operation rather than 
the response rate of farmers’ complaints. On the other hand, if farmers’ risk attitudes between 
the two groups are significantly different, the two groups of farmers should have important 
differences in their asset arrangements. Therefore, these two control variable should hold 
constant so as not to influence the empirical outcomes. 
 
To measure the production capacities, farmers have been requested to report how many 
slaughtering pigs and sows that they have at the same time in their farms.  
 
Table 12. Parameters of farmers’ production capacities  
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value 
<200 200 - 1000 >1000 <200 200 - 1000 >1000 Slaughter 
pigs 26 24 16 34 17 16 2.254 0.324 
<150 150 - 500 >500 <150 150 - 500 >500 
Sows 
41 13 3 47 14 3 
0.041 0.980 
 
As Table 12 illustrates, two large p-values give no statistical differences in the numbers of 
slaughtering pigs and sows between the two groups. Hence, “FCB farmers” and “IOF 
farmers” do not differ significantly on production capacities. 
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Another question on farmers’ preferred payments for their animals have been asked in the 
questionnaire to test farmers’ risk attitudes. It assumes that alternative contracts are available 
to the farmers, one is the offer with a fixed price of 14 SEK/kg, and the other alternative with 
a fluctuating price which could vary between 12 and 16 SEK/kg (the probabilities between 
receiving a higher price and a lower are equal), farmers are asked which offer they are prefer.  
 
Table 13. Parameters of farmers’ risk attitudes  
 "FCB farmers" "IOF farmers" chi-square p-value 
Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 1 Alt. 2 
Risk attitudes 
20 42 21 41 
0.036 0.849 
 
The fairly large p-value (0.0849) in Table 12 also gives no significant difference in farmers’ 
choices between the two groups. Hence, “FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers” do not differ 
significantly on risk attitudes as well. 
 
Since all statistical tests of the two control variables give no significant differences between 
the two groups, it is confident to conclude that these two control variables have no affects on 
the obtained differences between the two groups. The other explanation of this finding is the 
reported results associated with statistics tests are reliable unless these two control variables 
are not appropriate to be introduced in this investigation. 
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6 Analysis  
 
The latent variables related to the transaction cost dimensions and the socio-psychological 
concepts have been tested statistically in the last chapter. The hypothesized determinant of the 
farmers’ choice of trading partner – transaction costs are, however, not yet confirmed by the 
empirical tests. Hence the analysis in this chapter is to explore if transaction costs determine 
farmers’ choices of trading partner. To analyze this, the hypotheses which are used to 
compare the different transaction costs between “FCB farmers” and “IOF farmers” ought to 
be tested.  
 
 
6.1 The hypotheses related to transaction cost dimensions 
 
Among the empirical findings in relation to farmers’ asset specificity, the two group farmers 
only differ in site specificity, i.e., “IOF farmers” have a longer distance from their firms to the 
slaughterhouses. On other words, the proper location of “FCB farmers” may lower their 
transaction costs since site specificity economize on inventory and transportation expenses 
(Williamson, 1996). However, no significant difference in human asset specificity and 
physical asset specificity are observed between the two groups of farmers. Hence, the site 
specificity difference can be seen as a rather week support for the first hypothesis (H1): “FCB 
farmers” have more transaction specific assets in their farming operations than “IOF 
farmers”.  
 
However, there is no statistical difference between the delivery volumes of the two farmer 
groups. This means that the empirical test doesn’t support the hypothesis related to the 
transaction frequency variable (H2), which says that “FCB farmers” sell larger volumes than 
“IOF farmers”. Hence, this hypothesis ought to be rejected confidently.  
 
According to the significant difference in information access between the two groups of 
farmers, it may be supposed that Scan provides more information to its suppliers. 
Nevertheless, the “FCB farmers” don’t believe that the information that they get is more 
reliable than what “IOF farmers” get from IOF slaughterhouses since no significant difference 
regarding information reliability is observed in both groups. Therefore, there is not enough 
empirical evidence to support that the difference in information access may create more 
asymmetric information in the relation between IOFs and “IOF farmers” than between Scan 
and “FCB farmers”, or to conclude “IOF farmers” experience more uncertainty than “FCB 
farmers”. Due to this, the hypothesis about “FCB farmers” experience more uncertainty in 
their relationship to the slaughterhouses than “IOF farmers” (H3) should not be accepted, 
but there is neither reason to reject it. 
 
To conclude; the three transaction cost dimensions do not indicate any major differences 
between the two groups of farmers as to their perceived transaction costs. As the transaction 
cost dimensions are compared, no asset specificity parameters were found to differ between 
the two groups of farmers. Due to the similar asset arrangements, neither the parameters of 
farmers’ transaction frequencies and their perceived uncertainties show any significant 
differences between the two groups. These findings correspond to transaction cost arguments 
which indicate that uncertainty and transaction frequency are often generated by asset 
specificity (Farazmand, 2002). For this reason, the hypothesis which states that “FCB 
farmers” have higher transaction costs than “IOF farmers” (H4) cannot be accepted.  
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However, the answers related to farmers’ general attitudes towards transacting with two types 
of trading partners provide explanations to the differences between the farmer groups. The 
parameters of transaction costs indicate that the two groups of farmers differ significantly in 
their perception of contact costs, contract cost and contract enforcement costs in relation to 
the two types of trading partners. Especially the “IOF farmers” have a solid belief that IOF 
slaughterhouses are easier to contact, to agree to a contract with and better at the contract 
enforcement than Scan. This belief of “IOF farmers” implies that “IOF farmers” invest fewer 
resources in collecting information, contracting and controlling the contracts than “FCB 
farmers”. Therefore the transaction cost level of “IOF farmers” is lower than “FCB farmers”. 
 
 
6.2 The hypotheses related to socio-psychological concepts 
 
The lower transaction costs of “IOF farmers” may be interpreted in terms of socio-
psychology, which include various kinds of farmer attitudes toward their trading partners. The 
two groups of farmers have significantly different attitudes towards their trading partners.  
 
When the farmers declare which type of slaughterhouse is the most trustworthy a dominating 
attitude is that IOF slaughterhouses are more trustworthy. This finding is contrary to the 
theoretical arguments, namely that investor-owned firms are “low-trust and coercive”, while 
vertically integrated firms (such as Scan) are “high-trust and democratic” (Shapira, 1999). 
Because of this, the hypothesis which is based on the theoretical argument that “FCB 
farmers” perceive more trust to their trading partners, as compared with “IOF farmers” 
(H5) should be rejected. 
 
Furthermore, when farmers were asked about involvement and influence issues both groups 
of farmers answered similarly. They perceive themselves to have more involvement in and 
stronger influence in IOF slaughterhouses. Since farmer participation in the governance of 
FCBs may be expected due to the FCBs’ cooperative roots, farmers should have more 
positive attitudes to Scan than to IOF slaughterhouses. Such positive attitudes may reduce the 
transaction costs in relation between Scan and “FCB farmers”. Nevertheless, the theoretical 
arguments do not hold true in this case. The empirical findings do not support that farmers 
have more positive attitudes toward Scan. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
farmers’ beliefs in the FCBs’ cooperative roots are not existent any more, at least not in the 
case of Scan. 
 
Since “IOF farmers” have perceived that their trading partners’ survival is much important for 
them and they are also willing to be involved in their trading partners, it is reasonable to 
conclude that “IOF farmers” have higher involvement in the slaughterhouses than “FCB 
farmers”. For this reason, the hypothesis which assumes “FCB farmers” have higher 
involvement in their trading partners, as compared with “IOF farmers” (H6) should be 
rejected confidently.  
 
The empirical finding also shows that “IOF farmers” are likely to perceive more influences on 
their trading partners than “FCB farmers” due to the different behavior towards farmers’ 
complaints between the two types of trading partners. Therefore, the hypothesis expresses that 
“FCB farmers” have more influence on their trading partners, as compared with “IOF 
farmers” (H7) is not accepted. 
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Based on the above analysis, when the two groups of farmers’ perceived transaction costs are 
combined with the socio-psychological concepts’ influence on transaction costs, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that Scan cannot be seen as a means to lower transaction costs. On the 
contrary, it seems that Scan has increased the transaction costs from the farmers’ points of 
views due to farmers’ negative attitudes to Scan. Hence, the final hypothesis (H8) which 
assumes that FCBs create lower transaction costs for the farmers than IOFs do may be 
confidently refused. 
 
 
6.3 A comparison with a prior study 
 
Since a similar study was conducted by Fahlbeck (1996), it is interesting to compare the 
observations in that study with those of this study. The most important difference between 
these two studies is the final outcomes. In Fahlbeck’s study, cooperatives were concluded as a 
means of lowering the farmers’ transaction costs, while the findings in this study indicate that 
IOFs create lower transaction cost for farmers. A plausible explanation is that the cooperative 
organizational form, studied by Fahlbeck, and the FCB model of this study are fundamentally 
different albeit today’s Scan is still farmer-owned and has cooperative roots. Through the 
transformation from a cooperative to a farmer-controlled business Scan lost its cooperative 
ideology and its good reputation among the farmer population. It is now considered to be one 
firm among others, operating as a profit-driven slaughterhouse, though only less efficiently.  
 
This explanation gets support from the empirical findings related to the socio-psychological 
concepts in this study, that is, when FCBs become large and complex, they may face 
difficulties in relation to their suppliers. Especially when some external co-owners participate 
in the governance, “the external co-owners bring with them another way of doing business, 
which is often not appreciated by the farmers” (Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell, 2009). As the 
FCBs can no longer lower the farmers’ transaction costs, it is reasonable that farmers have a 
negative attitude to them. 
  37 
 
 
7 Discussion 
 
Besides transaction costs, some other factors may have an effect on farmers’ choice of trading 
partner. Three of them are highlighted and discussed in this chapter. They are observed in the 
empirical study, but they are not investigated in depth because they are extraneous to the two 
types of theories. Nevertheless they are important and they are related to the farmers’ choice.  
 
First, the ownership structure is an evident difference between Scan and the IOFs. Because of 
this difference, Swedish pig farmers are categorized into two groups; one is selling to Scan 
and the other is selling to IOF slaughterhouses. The takeover of Scan by HK Roukatalo is, 
however, likely to influence the farmers’ attitudes to Scan. The eventual direct impact that the 
slaughterhouses’ ownership form may have on the farmers’ attitudes to the slaughterhouses 
was examined in the empirical study. The question concerned whether the farmers would 
change their choice of slaughterhouse if Scan and IOFs altered their ownership structures. The 
answers indicate that there are no important differences between the two groups of farmers. 
Most farmers in both groups believe that they probably change their initial choice. This 
finding indicates that the ownership difference between Scan and IOF slaughterhouses has an 
effect on farmers’ attitude to their trading partner, and therefore farmers’ choice of trading 
partner is determined by the ownership structures of the slaughterhouses. 
 
The second extraneous factor is the slaughterhouses’ pricing strategies. It is not a secret that 
IOF slaughterhouses tend to offer a better price to their suppliers than Scan. This phenomenon 
can be observed in some farmers’ comments within the questionnaires. Several farmers stated 
that they are much concerned about the price of their animals and a couple of the Scan 
suppliers acknowledged that they would get a higher payment if they were to deliver to IOFs. 
This is of course no surprising. The complaints of low payment were more intensive in the 
group of “FCB farmers”. Hence, it may be assumed that to the extent that price is an 
important variable in the farmers’ decision to switch partners the “FCB farmers” are more 
likely to switch. This assumption is supported by the answers to the questionnaire’s question 
about whether the farmers have changed slaughterhouse. Among the 77 “IOF farmers” who 
answers this question, only three denied that they had changed slaughterhouses before, 
whereas 81% of “FCB farmers” reported that they never changed partners. Although no 
empirical findings are available to verify that the 74 “IOF farmers” who have changed their 
trading partners are former suppliers to Scan, at least there is a linkage between the different 
switching frequencies and the different payment between the two kinds of slaughterhouses. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that price is an important determinant of farmers’ 
choice of trading partners. 
 
The third latent factor should be the farmers’ loyalty to their trading partner, which may also 
link to the question of changing slaughterhouses in the questionnaire. The significantly 
different answers between the two groups to this question, on the other hand, may be 
interpreted as “FCB farmers” show more their loyalties to Scan than “IOF farmers” do. 
Farmers’ loyalty is closely related with farmers’ attitude toward their trading partner. If 
farmers show a bad attitude toward their trading partners, it is impossible that farmers have 
high level loyalty to their trading partners. Since all empirical tests have the same direction 
that “FCB farmers” take a negative attitude to Scan, the finding of “FCB farmers” have more 
loyal thinking than “IOF farmers” would not be accepts. Then, if farmers’ attitude can not 
explain why just few “FCB farmers” have changed slaughterhouses, some other factors may 
be valid to explain it. The most reasonable explanation is that “FCB farmers” have a variety 
of barriers that may hinder them to change slaughterhouse, such as lack of information about 
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other slaughterhouses, a locked-in contract with Scan and risk aversion. Therefore, farmers’ 
loyal thinking can not be regarded as the determinant that can influence their choices of 
slaughterhouses. 
 
The last factor that may influence farmers’ choice is about other persons’ opinions. This 
factor is important for farmers since decisions cannot be made in a vacuum. It assumes that 
farmers have close connections with each others and they also share information within a 
particularly social society (such as the agricultural cooperative society). This factor is 
examined in the empirical tests. Farmers have been asked whether their choice of trading 
partner is affected by the people whom they are familiar with. .The answers to this question 
show statistical differences between the two groups of farmers. Most “IOF farmers” perceive 
that they have the same trading partner as the people that they socialize with. This means 
“IOF farmers” are more sensitive to other persons’ opinions than “FCB farmers”. Hence, their 
choice of trading partner is more likely to be influenced by other persons’ opinion. Due to this 
observation, the factor related to other persons’ opinions should be regarded as a determinant 
of farmers’ choice of trading partner. 
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8 Conclusions  
 
This study shows that transaction costs are significant in affecting farmers’ choice of trading 
partner. It also demonstrates that the degree of farmers’ perceived transaction costs are 
determined by which type of slaughterhouses they choose to deliver to. The farmers 
delivering to Scan feel that they have higher transaction costs than the farmers who send their 
pigs to IOF slaughterhouses. This finding implies that the theoretical argument (traditional 
cooperative are organized to lower farmers’ transaction costs) may not apply to Scan. This is 
because the takeover of Scan in 2007 changes Scan’ ownership structure and today’s Scan 
cannot be characterized as a cooperative. The change of Scan’s ownership structure may 
result in farmers’ negative opinions of Scan, and thereby increasing farmers’ perceived costs 
of transacting with Scan.  
 
According to the findings related to farmers’ attitude towards Scan, Scan seems to have a big 
problem with the farmers.This problem can be regarded as a crisis of confidence between 
Scan and the farmers since majority of farmers consider Scan’s competitors (IOF 
slaughterhouses) are trustworthier than Scan. The findings also show that the farmers are no 
longer able to control Scan due to the takeover of Scan by the external investor. Because of 
this, the farmers become dissatisfied with Scan and they loose their interests to be involved in 
Scan. The consequence of farmers’ negative opinions to Scan may be that the farmers with a 
high degree of specific assets and transaction frequency would not consider Scan as a 
safeguard to reduce the uncertainty by transacting with the slaughterhouses, thereby lowering 
the transaction costs. This has been proved by the empirical study because there are no 
important relationships between the economic variables (the three transaction cost dimensions) 
and farmers’ perceived transaction costs. This observation also implies that the farmers to a 
large extent assess their trading partners in social terms (the three socio-psychological 
concepts) rather than economic ones. Hence the application of socio-psychological theory 
turns out to be valuable in this study. 
 
The above-mentioned problem between Scan and the farmers can be seen as a warning to 
Scan. If Scan does not take some measures to change the relationship with the farmers, Scan 
may lose a large numbers of suppliers when the suppliers’ contracts expire. In order to keep 
the current suppliers and recruit the new suppliers, Scan must perform more efficiently to 
reduce the farmers’ perceived transaction costs. Then, what is Scan supposed to do to realize 
this? The answers to this question are available in the findings of this study. One suggestion 
from the findings is that Scan would have to re-design its communication strategy in relation 
to the farmers. If the farmers get more reliable information from Scan, the contact costs in 
relation to Scan would be reduced. Another suggestion is that Scan should pay more attention 
to farmers’ voices (farmers’complaints, questions and suggestions). If the farmers perceive 
that their voice gets good attention, the costs of agreeing a contract and enforcing the contract 
with Scan may be lower. However, these suggestions are based on a precondition, which is 
that Scan must offer a competitive price to the farmers. Without this, the farmers probably 
would not change their attitude towards Scan. 
 
It should be noted that the findings of this study are based on the farmers’ perception of 
transaction costs. The transaction costs of the slaughterhouses are not examined. For this sake, 
it seems that the transaction costs from the slaughterhouses’ perspective are necessary to 
investigate in a future study. Probably, this future study can be implemented by comparing the 
accounting figures between Scan and the IOF slaughterhouses. 
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Hopefully, these empirical findings in this study may have some specific contribution to 
future researches. But it must be emphasized that this study only concerns one FCB in one 
industry of one country, and therefore these finding are not generally valid.  
 
One should keep in mind that once there exist FCBs in a market, the FCBs’ competitors 
(IOFs) may have to adjust their strategies, just as FCBs have to adjust to the IOFs. The 
competition between FCBs and IOFs will never stop unless one of them disappears from the 
market. Therefore, every single change of FCBs or IOFs is worth to be explored by 
researchers. Comparisons between FCBs and IOFs will always be of interest for scholars. 
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Appendix 1. Number of piglets and total number of 
pigs in June 2008 
Average incorrectnesses are market as italics after the data.  
Standard errors in per cent. 
Område  Smågrisar,
under 20 kg
Summa 
svin 
Län         
Stockholms     2 891 7,3 15 372 5,3 
Uppsala     11 667 2,6 32 901 2,3 
Södermanlands    17 376 2,6 58 663 2,9 
Östergötlands    33 473 1,8 114 883 1,4 
Jönköpings    4 761 1,0 14 012 0,6 
Kronobergs    3 485 0,5 14 852 0,2 
Kalmar    25 365 1,7 81 806 1,2 
Gotlands    17 137 0,2 59 871 1,2 
Blekinge    6 599 3,6 32 531 2,7 
Skåne    143 298 0,5 475 206 0,4 
Hallands    53 751 2,1 199 234 3,5 
Västra Götalands    83 787 0,7 291 808 0,4 
Värmlands    16 753 1,6 56 765 2,1 
Örebro    11 943 2,6 47 477 2,2 
Västmanlands    20 256 2,8 60 178 2,2 
Dalarnas    2 676 0,4 7 031 0,8 
Gävleborgs    1 729 3,6 7 580 3,4 
Västernorrlands    1 901 0,7 8 593 0,6 
Jämtlands    193 15,2 635 5,5 
Västerbottens    4 769 2,6 18 731 1,1 
Norrbottens    1 535 0,7 11 161 0,3 
          
Produktionsområde         
Götalands södra slättbygder    101 368 1,2 366 850 1,9 
Götalands mellanbygder    105 562 0,6 351 373 0,5 
Götalands norra slättbygder    96 565 0,8 349 402 0,6 
Svealands slättbygder    75 917 1,1 251 688 0,9 
Götalands skogsbygder    64 752 0,9 210 315 0,8 
Mellersta Sveriges skogsb.    10 704 2,0 31 079 3,2 
Nedre Norrland    4 155 1,7 18 646 1,6 
Övre Norrland    6 321 1,9 29 936 0,7 
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Stödområde         
1    84 34,4 508 12,1 
2a    6 452 1,9 31 354 0,7 
2b    2 548 0,5 11 920 0,4 
3    3 681 1,7 9 170 2,8 
4a+4b    19 482 1,5 64 493 1,9 
5a    10 124 1,2 32 345 1,0 
5b    48 242 1,2 148 932 0,8 
5c    18 204 2,4 56 859 2,5 
5m    14 567 2,0 54 432 1,7 
Övriga riket    341 961 0,5 1 199 277 0,6 
          
Hela riket         
2008    465 345 0,4 1 609 289 0,5 
2007    479 518 - 1 676 327 - 
2006    491 644 0,6 1 680 535 0,5 
2005    537 800 - 1 811 216 - 
 
Source: The Swedish Board of Agriculture, 2008 
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Appendix 2. Slaughtering of livestock at 
slaughterhouses 
    
Jan - dec 
Jan - Dec Dec Dec 
Dec 
Dec 
Dec
Dec 
  2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
                    
Slaktsvin Fattening pigs                   
Antal (1 000-tal) 1000 heads 2 918,61 2 889,54 2 922,35 2 918,61 2 889,54 2 922,35 201,66 197,91 222,77 
Kvantitet (1 000 ton) Quantity 251,56 250,91 253,56 251,56 250,91 253,56 17,20 17,20 18,83 
Suggor Sows                   
Antal (1 000-tal) 1000 heads 56,36 59,68 56,45 56,36 59,68 56,45 3,83 3,69 3,79 
Kvantitet (1 000 ton) Quantity 9,24 9,70 9,00 9,24 9,70 9,00 0,64 0,60 0,62 
Galtar Boars                   
Antal (1 000-tal) 1000 heads 1,65 1,77 1,68 1,65 1,77 1,68 0,12 0,10 0,10 
Kvantitet (1 000 ton) Quantity 0,26 0,28 0,27 0,26 0,28 0,27 0,02 0,02 0,02 
Unggris Young pigs                   
Antal (1 000-tal) 1000 heads 8,58 11,93 12,10 8,58 11,93 12,10 0,92 1,08 1,42 
Kvantitet (1 000 ton) Quantity 0,33 0,47 0,47 0,33 0,47 0,47 0,04 0,04 0,06 
Unggalt Young boars                   
Antal (1 000-tal) 1000 heads 36,51 40,70 41,20 36,51 40,70 41,20 2,78 3,03 3,21 
Kvantitet (1 000 ton) Quantity 3,06 3,43 3,46 3,06 3,43 3,46 0,23 0,25 0,26 
                    
S:a Svin Total Pigs                   
Antal (1 000-tal) 1000 heads 3 022,26 3 004,11 3 033,80 3 022,26 3 004,11 3 033,80 209,31 205,81 231,29 
Kvantitet (1 000 ton) Quantity 264,45 264,87 266,76 264,45 264,87 266,76 18,13 18,11 19,78 
                    
 
Note: The totals may include minor groups which are not presented separately in this table. 
Source: Regina-slaughter (Slaughter Database of Swedish Board of Agriculture), 2008 
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Appendix 3. Pig slaughterhouses in Sweden 
 
Companies, locations, and shares (%) of slaughtered pigs during the first six monthes of 2008 
(total slaughtered pigs 1,525,523 st) 
 
 
 
Source: KCF (Swedish Meat Industry Assocaition), 2008 
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Appendix 4. Questionnaire  
 
Questionnaire: Perceived differences between Scan AB and other slaughterhouses 
The aim of this study is to clarify the perceived differences between Scan and the other 
slaughterhouses. That is why we wonder which slaughterhouse you are delivering to: 
 
1.1 Which slaughterhouse or which slaughterhouses do you deliver to and how large 
percentage of your animals do you send to each slaughterhouse? 
 Scan ________ % 
 Ugglarps Slakteri ________ % 
 KLS Livsmedel ________ % 
 Ginsten Slakteri ________ % 
 Dalsjöfors Slakteri ________ % 
 SLP ________ % 
 Sell at the spot market ________ % 
 Other slaughterhouse………………….. ________ % 
TOTAL 100 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Imagine that you are advising a friend who is considering starting raising pigs. Your friend is 
not sure whether to deliver to Scan or to another slaughterhouse. Your friend has studied the 
slaughter prices and found that there are no large differences between the alternatives. The 
service does not seem to differ either. Your task is to clarify to your friend which alternative 
that is the best considering the aspects listed below.  
 
2.1 This slaughterhouse will consider your suggestions, questions and complaints to larger 
extent than the other: 
 Scan  
 Another slaughterhouse 
 It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion.  
 
2.2 The survival of this slaughterhouse is the most important for your future production: 
 Scan  
 Another slaughterhouse 
 It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion.  
 
2.3 You can trust this slaughterhouse more than the other: 
 Scan  
 Another slaughterhouse 
 It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion.  
 
2.4 It is easier to get in contact with this slaughterhouse: 
 Scan  
 Another slaughterhouse 
 It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion.  
 
2.5 It is easier to agree to a contract with this slaughterhouse: 
 Scan  
 Another slaughterhouse 
 It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion. 
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2.6 This slaughterhouse is the best at following the contracted terms: 
 Scan  
 Another slaughterhouse 
 It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion.  
 
2.7 This slaughterhouse provides the most reliable market information: 
 Scan  
 Another slaughterhouse 
 It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion.  
 
2.8 This slaughterhouse will treat you better than the other will: 
 Scan  
 Another slaughterhouse 
 It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion.  
 
2.9 Generally, which slaughterhouse would you recommend to your friend? 
 Scan  
 Another slaughterhouse 
 It doesn’t matter/I have no opinion.  
 
2.10 Assume that Swedish Meats and LSO withdraw as owners to Scan or that any of the 
other slaughterhouses would get pig farmers as owners – would you then change your advice? 
 
 Probably  Probably not 
 1 2  3 
 
2.11 Assume that you are considering to advice your friend to deliver to Scan – how much 
more must another slaughterhouse pay compared to Scan in order for you to change your 
advice? Assume that both alternatives are paying approximately 13/SEK/kg (incl. dividend, 
bonuses etc.)  
  0:00 < 0:05 kr more per kg 
  0:05 < 0:15 kr more per kg 
  0:15 < 0:50 kr more per kg 
  0:50 < 1:00 kr more per kg 
  1:00 < 2:00 kr more per kg 
  2:00 < kr more per kg 
 
2.12 Assume that you are considering to advice your friend to deliver to some other 
slaughterhouse than Scan – how much more must Scan pay compared to the other 
slaughterhouse in order for you to change your advice? Assume that both alternatives are 
paying approximately 13/SEK/kg (incl. dividend, bonuses etc.)  
  0:00 < 0:05 kr more per kg 
  0:05 < 0:15 kr more per kg 
  0:15 < 0:50 kr more per kg 
  0:50 < 1:00 kr more per kg 
  1:00 < 2:00 kr more per kg 
  2:00 < kr more per kg 
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This section discusses your experiences of the slaughterhouse(s) that you deliver to. 
 
3.1 How fare is it to the slaughterhouse(s) that you are delivering to?  ______ kilometer 
 ______ kilometer 
 
3.2 Do you receive market and financial information (information regarding supply and 
demand of pigs and pork) from the slaughterhouse(s) that you are delivering to today? 
  Yes    No 
 
3.3 How reliable is the information you receive from the slaughterhouses? 
 
 Very reliable Reliable Neither Not reliable Very unreliable 
           
 
3.4 How many times during the previous year have you complained about anything or 
suggested something to the slaughterhouse(s) that you deliver to? 
 
Scan :__________times 
Other slaughterhouses:___________ times 
 
3.5 How many times have your complaint or suggestion resulted in a change? 
 
Scan :__________times 
Other slaughterhouses:___________ times 
 
3.6 What do you think about the following slaughterhouses (give a mark for all 
slaughterhouses even if you do not deliver to them): 
 Like very much    Do not like at all 
 1 2 3 4 5  Don’t know 
Scan              
Ugglarps Slakteri              
KLS Livsmedel             
Ginsten Slakteri              
Dalsjöfors Slakteri              
SLP             
Other:____________             
 
3.7 How reliable do you think the following slaughterhouses are (give a mark for all 
slaughterhouses even if you do not deliver to them): 
 Very reliable    Very unreliable 
 1 2 3 4 5  Don’t know 
Scan              
Ugglarps Slakteri              
KLS Livsmedel             
Ginsten Slakteri              
Dalsjöfors Slakteri              
SLP             
Other:_________             
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3.8 How good treatment do you get/think you would get from the following slaughterhouses 
(give a mark for all slaughterhouses even if you do not deliver to them): 
 Very good    Very bad 
 1 2 3 4 5 Don’t know 
Scan              
Ugglarps Slakteri              
KLS Livsmedel             
Ginsten Slakteri              
Dalsjöfors Slakteri              
SLP             
Other:____________             
 
3.9 Have you ever changed slaughterhouse? If so, how many times have you changed? 
  Yes   No  _________ times 
 
3.10 How many pigs in total did you deliver to slaughter during 2008? 
  < 500 pigs   500-3000 pigs    3000-6000 pigs
    > 6000 pigs 
 
3.11 Assume that the slaughterhouse that you are delivering to offers you two kinds of 
contracts. The contract will be valid for your total production during one year. The first 
alternative offers you a fixed price during the period. The other alternative offers you a 
fluctuating price, which implies that you can both loose and earn money in relation to 
alternative one: 
1) You get 14 SEK/kg or 
2) You will get paid between 12 and 16 SEK/kg. The probability for receiving a price 
higher than 14 SEK is equal to receiving a lower price.  
Which alternative do you prefer? 
  I prefer alt. 1    I prefer alt. 2 
 
3.12 If you had no contract today, which slaughterhouse(s) would you choose to deliver to? 
 Scan  ________ % 
 Ugglarps Slakteri  ________ % 
 KLS Livsmedel ________ % 
 Ginsten Slakteri  ________ % 
 Dalsjöfors Slakteri  ________ % 
 SLP ________ % 
 Sell at the spot market ________ % 
 Other slaughterhouse……………………________ % 
TOTAL 100 % 
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This section will provide background information about you and your company. 
4.1 How old are you?  
  <30   30-50   50-65   >65 
4.2 Gender:  
  Male    Female 
4.3 Highest completed education:  
  Primary/secondary school 
  Agricultural high school 
  High school 
  After-high school short education (e.g. management courses, BYS, Gårdsmästare etc.) 
  Agricultural Collage/University, namely: ___________________ 
  Collage/University 
4.4 How many percent of your working hours do you spend at the farm?  
……. % (of which ……. % spent on pig raising) 
4.5 Do you have experience from working outside the farm?  
  Yes    No 
4.6 What kind of pig production do you have?  
  Slaughter pigs    Piglets   Integrated production, totally or 
partly 
4.7 How many slaughter pigs do you have at the same time at the farm?  
  < 200   200-1000    > 1000 
4.8 How many sows do you have at the same time at the farm?  
  < 150   150-300    > 500 
4.9 If you were to sell your farm today (incl. the animals) would you then get the money 
you have invested back? 
  Yes   No    Don’t know 
4.10 Generally, what in what conditions are your equipment and houses at the farm (stables 
with equipment, machinery etc.)? 
  New (during last three years)   Good condition   Worn out   Don’t 
know  
4.11 To what slaughterhouse do the most people you know deliver (neighbors, friends, 
acquaintances, relatives)? 
  Same as me  
  Other than me 
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Appendix 5. Chi-square table  
area .995  .990  .975  .950  .900  .750  .500  .250  .100  
1  0.00004 0.00016 0.00098 0.00393 0.01579 0.10153 0.45494 1.32330 2.70554 
2  0.01003 0.02010 0.05064 0.10259 0.21072 0.57536 1.38629 2.77259 4.60517 
3  0.07172 0.11483 0.21580 0.35185 0.58437 1.21253 2.36597 4.10834 6.25139 
4  0.20699 0.29711 0.48442 0.71072 1.06362 1.92256 3.35669 5.38527 7.77944 
5  0.41174 0.55430 0.83121 1.14548 1.61031 2.67460 4.35146 6.62568 9.23636 
6  0.67573 0.87209 1.23734 1.63538 2.20413 3.45460 5.34812 7.84080 10.64464 
7  0.98926 1.23904 1.68987 2.16735 2.83311 4.25485 6.34581 9.03715 12.01704 
8  1.34441 1.64650 2.17973 2.73264 3.48954 5.07064 7.34412 10.21885 13.36157 
9  1.73493 2.08790 2.70039 3.32511 4.16816 5.89883 8.34283 11.38875 14.68366 
10 2.15586 2.55821 3.24697 3.94030 4.86518 6.73720 9.34182 12.54886 15.98718 
11 2.60322 3.05348 3.81575 4.57481 5.57778 7.58414 10.34100 13.70069 17.27501 
12 3.07382 3.57057 4.40379 5.22603 6.30380 8.43842 11.34032 14.84540 18.54935 
13 3.56503 4.10692 5.00875 5.89186 7.04150 9.29907 12.33976 15.98391 19.81193 
14 4.07467 4.66043 5.62873 6.57063 7.78953 10.16531 13.33927 17.11693 21.06414 
15 4.60092 5.22935 6.26214 7.26094 8.54676 11.03654 14.33886 18.24509 22.30713 
16 5.14221 5.81221 6.90766 7.96165 9.31224 11.91222 15.33850 19.36886 23.54183 
17 5.69722 6.40776 7.56419 8.67176 10.08519 12.79193 16.33818 20.48868 24.76904 
18 6.26480 7.01491 8.23075 9.39046 10.86494 13.67529 17.33790 21.60489 25.98942 
19 6.84397 7.63273 8.90652 10.11701 11.65091 14.56200 18.33765 22.71781 27.20357 
20 7.43384 8.26040 9.59078 10.85081 12.44261 15.45177 19.33743 23.82769 28.41198 
21 8.03365 8.89720 10.28290 11.59131 13.23960 16.34438 20.33723 24.93478 29.61509 
22 8.64272 9.54249 10.98232 12.33801 14.04149 17.23962 21.33704 26.03927 30.81328 
23 9.26042 10.19572 11.68855 13.09051 14.84796 18.13730 22.33688 27.14134 32.00690 
24 9.88623 10.85636 12.40115 13.84843 15.65868 19.03725 23.33673 28.24115 33.19624 
25 10.51965 11.52398 13.11972 14.61141 16.47341 19.93934 24.33659 29.33885 34.38159 
26 11.16024 12.19815 13.84390 15.37916 17.29188 20.84343 25.33646 30.43457 35.56317 
27 11.80759 12.87850 14.57338 16.15140 18.11390 21.74940 26.33634 31.52841 36.74122 
28 12.46134 13.56471 15.30786 16.92788 18.93924 22.65716 27.33623 32.62049 37.91592 
29 13.12115 14.25645 16.04707 17.70837 19.76774 23.56659 28.33613 33.71091 39.08747 
30 13.78672 14.95346 16.79077 18.49266 20.59923 24.47761 29.33603 34.79974 40.25602 
Source: StatSoft, Inc., 1984
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